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Abstract
This study was commissioned by the European Committee on Crime Problems at the Council
of Europe to describe and discuss the standards used to asses the admissibility and appraisal of
scientific evidence in various member countries. After documenting cases in which faulty forensic
evidence seems to have played a critical role, the authors describe the legal foundations of the
issues of admissibility and assessment of the probative value in the field of scientific evidence,
contrasting criminal justice systems of accusatorial and inquisitorial tradition and the various risks
that they pose in terms of equality of arms. Special attention is given to communication issues
between lawyers and scientific experts. The authors eventually investigate possible ways of
improving the system. Among these mechanisms, emphasis is put on the adoption of a common
terminology for expressing the weight of evidence. It is also proposed to adopt an harmonized
interpretation framework among forensic experts rooted in good practices of logical inference.
The foreword was authored by D. Michael Risinger, Seton Hall University School of Law.
Author Notes: Comparative study on scientific evidence drawn up for the Bureau of the Council
of Europe’s European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC). The authors would like to thank
Prof. Pierre Margot for his helpful comments and the translators from the Council of Europe for
translating a report originally written in French.
FOREWORD 
 
For both practitioners and academics, it is difficult but important to avoid 
insularity and parochialism in most areas of legal practice.  It is difficult because 
practical considerations tend to focus us on local, or at most, national practices.  It 
is important because knowledge of how other developed legal cultures1 deal with 
particular issues can inform our own view of the possibilities for improvements in 
our own system.  Forensic science is a good example both of the tendency toward 
insularity, and of the insights that can be gained by knowledge of approaches in 
other cultures.   
I am not suggesting searching out the truly exotic.  Forensic practices in 
North Korea are unlikely to have much to offer of interest or value, especially 
given the efforts needed to discover their contours.  The English speaking world 
offers many important contrasts and potential lessons.   For instance, there is 
much be learned from the Canadian practice of conducting detailed “autopsies” 
on prominent miscarriages of justice, including those involving miscarried 
forensic science.2  And of course, in 2009 the National Research Council (NRC) 
of the American National Academy of Science (NAS) issued its report which 
contained much that might be of value to those in other countries.3   Moreover 
later in 2009 the Law Commission (UK) issued a report on forensic science and 
the courts4 which was in some ways an informative contrast with the American 
NAS/NRC Report.  This journal published an article giving one view of the 
contrast, in order to bring both reports to the attention of readers on both sides of 
the Atlantic, and elsewhere.5    
However, penetrating the realities of practice in Europe is a more difficult 
task, given the number of jurisdictions and the resulting language barriers 
involved. With that in mind, we are fortunate to be able to present in English 
                                                 
1 At least those generally conceded to be functioning representatives of the rule of law. 
2  See, e.g., the Report of the Kaufmann Commission on Proceedings involving Guy Paul Morin, 
Ministry of the Attorney General, Ontario (Toronto, 1998).   
3 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC 
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009).  This Report is sometimes referred to 
as the NAS Report and sometimes as the NRC Report in the literature.  For a full account of the 
rather Byzantine organization of the National Academy of Sciences, and its equally Byzantine 
relationship with Congressional directives, and the difficulties these things create in arriving at a 
single authoritative characterization for this report, see D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report 
on Forensic Science: A Path Forward Fraught with Pitfalls, 2010 Utah L. Rev. 225, fn. 1 (2010). 
4 The Law Commission “The Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in 
England and Wales: A New Approach to the Determination of Evidentiary Reliability” (2009) 
Consultation Paper 190. 
5 Rhonda M. Wheate & Alan Jamieson, A Tale of Two Approaches—The NAS Report and the Law 
Revision Consultation Paper on Forensic Science, 7 Int. Comm. On Evidence, Issue 2, art. 3 
(2009). 
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translation a report commissioned by the Council of Europe on the state of 
forensic practice both globally and in the European Union (with recommendations 
for improvement), entitled Scientific Evidence in Europe—Admissibility, 
Evaluation and Equality of Arms.6  The authors are Dr. Christophe Champod, 
Professor on the faculty of Law and Criminal Science in the University of 
Lausanne, Switzerland, and Joelle Vuille, Research Assistant in the same 
institution.  Professor Champod and Ms. Vuille do a fine job of surveying the 
current status of forensic science in both various English speaking jurisdictions 
and in the European Union, and the legal principles which control its utilization in 
criminal cases (indeed, their report functions as a sort of introductory one-stop 
shop for those interested in expanding their knowledge of these various 
approaches).  They then turn their attention to a variety of recommendations for 
improved practice within the EU.     
Of course, it is in the nature of such a report that it will necessarily 
encompass a view from 30,000 feet, and those intimately familiar with one or 
another of the jurisdictions surveyed may find themselves quibbling with this or 
that detail of the description set out.  For instance, an American reader might find 
that the Champod/Vuille Report’s account of the Frye test did not capture either 
the effulgent variety of approaches that go by that name, or the besetting problems 
of such approaches when it comes to addressing the requirement of “novelty,” to 
defining what constitutes “general acceptance” or to selecting the set of “scientific 
experts” by reference to which the issue of general acceptance is to be 
determined.  But such objections would be misplaced to a great degree.  The 
Report is necessarily a vade mecum, not a complete treatise.    
Also, of course, there is room to disagree with some of the positions taken 
in the Report, or at least with their apparent emphasis.  For instance, the authors’ 
position on the need for “context” information in the proper performance of 
forensic examinations7 comes perilously close to crossing the line separating a 
forensic expert from an all purpose Sherlock Holmes figure.8  However, with only 
a moderate adjustment the authors’ position can become consistent with 
                                                
6 Christophe Champod and Joelle Vuille, Scientific Evidence in Europe—Admissibility, Evaluation 
and Equality of Arms (a report to the Council of Europe, originally produced 2010) (Hereinafter 
“the Champod/Vuille Report”). 
7 See Champod / Vuille Report, infra, at fn 174-fn 180. 
8 On the dangers of letting forensic experts go beyond the strict limits of their expertise to become 
general detectives, see D. Michael Risinger, Michael J. Saks, William C. Thompson & Robert 
Rosenthal, The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden 
Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 27-30 (2002).  On the dangers 
inherent in the Sherlock Holmes model of heroic positivist detection, see D. Michael Risinger, 
Boxes in Boxes: Julian Barnes, Conan Doyle, Sherlock Holmes and the Edalji Case, 4 INT’L 
COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE, issue 2, article 3 (Dec. 2006), at 6-9, available at 
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 “sequential unmasking” models being called for by some of us in the United 
States, because such an approach provides all needed context, but insulates the 
bench examiner doing the tests and initial characterizations from everything but 
the information necessary to that function, given in the order least likely to distort 
the results through observer bias.9 
 Beyond that, the authors’ affection for likelihood ratios as the means for 
expressing expert conclusions is understandable, given the fact that Professor 
Champod is a prominent early exponent of such an approach,10 and also a member 
of a group that has pioneered a brilliant method for extracting data from 
fingerprints that can generate empirically justified likelihood ratios for the truly 
binary competing propositions:  “suspect was the source of the fingermark (latent 
print)” versus “some other human was the source of the fingermark (latent 
print).11  However, I for one remain suspicious of a generalized likelihood ratio 
approach to communicating the meaning of much expert information, especially if 
experts are given the kind of interpretational role in regard to party theories that 
the Champod/Vuille Report seems to envision.  In a criminal case, at least in the 
United States, the defense has no obligation to put forth any specific theory, and 
the characterization of the second hypothesis in a likelihood ratio as the “defense 
theory” in the case can be problematic and misleading.  In addition, while 
likelihood ratios can in theory be used to express the relative support of a given 
piece of evidence for any two hypotheses accounting for it, likelihood ratios are 
least problematic and least subject to misinterpretation in regard to true binaries, 
and true binaries can be  slippery and difficult to formulate in the context of the 
                                                 
9 See Risinger et al, supra note 8, at, 45-47;  Dan E. Krane et al., , Sequential Unmasking: A Means 
of Minimizing Observer Effects in Forensic DNA Interpretation, (Letter/Commentary) 53 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 1006, 1006 (2008). Dan E. Krane et al., Response to Wells, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 501 
(2009); Dan E. Krane et al., Response to Ostrum, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1500 (2009); Dan E. Krane 
et al., Commentary on Budowle et al, 55 J. FORENSIC SCI. 273 (2009); William C. Thompson et. 
al., Response to Thornton, 65 J. Forensic Sci. 1663. Mnookin et al, The Need for A Research 
Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 725, 770-771(2011).  
10 See Evett, I., Gill, P.D., Jackson, G., Whitaker, J. and Champod, C., Interpreting small 
quantities of DNA:  the hierarchy of propositions and the use of Bayesian networks, 47 J. Forensic 
Sci. 520 (2002); Jackson, G., Jones, S., Booth, G., Champod, C., and Evett, I., The nature of the 
forensic science opinion—a possible framework to guide thinking and practicein investigations 
and court proceedings, 46 Sci. & J. 33 (2006). 
11 See Neumann, C., C. Champod, R. Puch-Solis, D. Meuwly, N. Egli, and A. Anthonioz (2006). 
Computation of likelihood ratios in fingerprint identification for configurations of three minutiae, 
51.J. Forensic Sci. 1255 (2006); Neumann, C., C. Champod, R. Puch-Solis, N. Egli, A. Anthonioz, 
and A. Bromage-Griffiths, Computation of likelihood ratios in fingerprint identification for 
configurations of any number of minutiae. 52 Journal of Forensic Sciences 54 (2007);  Neumann, 
C., I.W. Evett and J. Skerrett, Quantifying the Weight of Evidence Assigned to a Forensic 
Fingerprint Comparison—A New Paradigm, Proceedings of the Royal Statistical Society, 
anticipated publication, 2011 (copy on file with author). 
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complexities of many criminal cases if one strays far from the simple negation of 
the presecution’s hypothesis. Finally, properly warranted sources of data to give 
properly warranted values to likelihood ratios are simply unavailable in regard to 
many propositions of interest, and falling back on the experience of the examiner 
to generate them is a questionable practice at best, in my opinion.12    
Be all this as it may be, it hardly detracts from the importance and 
usefulness of this Report, both for its originally intended audience in the Council 
of Europe, and for the more extended audience it will now have in the greater 
international legal community by virtue of its publication here.     
Finally, one term in the title of the report perhaps could do with some 
preliminary explanation.  The notion of  “equality of arms” is actually drawn from 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, and despite its rather martial 
imagery, might better be described as “equality of resources” between the 
prosecution and defense, as far as access to forensic evidence is concerned.  The 
problems of unequal resources available to defense and prosecution is a recurring 
theme in American writings on forensic science, and it is quite informative to see 
how the same problem is addressed in Europe.  Whether the problem is addressed 
more effectively I leave to the reader of the Champod/Vuille Report.   
Michael Risinger 
  
                                                
12 Such considerations apparently lie behind the recent decision of the High Court of Justice, Court 
of Appeal, Criminal Division in R. v. T., [2010] EWCA Crim. 2439 (Dec. 26, 2010).  Whether 
that opinion is too restrictive in forbidding use of a likelihood ratio approach as an aid to the 
forensic expert’s formulation of his or her own conclusion is a question for another day.   
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 Scientific Evidence in Europe – Admissibility, 
Evaluation and Equality of Arms 
 
Christophe Champod and Joëlle Vuille 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this report is to assess the use of scientific evidence in criminal 
proceedings in Europe, to describe how such evidence is currently interpreted and 
appraised, and to study the impact of this evidence in terms of the principle of 
equality of arms. Criminal justice is making increasing use of scientific 
evidence13, which is becoming increasingly complex. At the same time, lawyers 
and citizens called upon to assess scientific evidence still lack the necessary 
training, and are generally unfamiliar with how scientific techniques are 
developed and the implications of these techniques for the nature of the 
knowledge produced14. Famous cases that highlight occasional major 
dysfunctions in the laboratories working with the justice system, and exaggerated 
interpretations of analytical findings, sometimes prompt questions about the 
scientific nature of certain forensic fields.  
Our presentation will start with a brief recapitulation of recent criticisms 
of various forensic disciplines in Europe and the United States, to retrace the 
genesis of the recent report of the US National Research Council (2009) and the 
recommendations of the Law Commission (2009) in England and Wales. While 
reviewing that situation, we will also emphasise the difficulty of formulating 
solutions on the basis of anecdotal cases. We will then outline the advantages and 
disadvantages generally ascribed to the accusatorial and inquisitorial systems with 
respect to the use of scientific evidence. That will enable us to move on to a 
discussion of the principle of equality of arms and the specific risks which these 
two main procedural systems present from the perspective of equality of arms. 
From there, we turn to a comparative analysis of the legislative options that 
European and North American countries chose to govern decision about whether 
to employ scientific evidence. No matter what legislative choices are made 
however, scientific evidence cannot be incorporated into fact-finding without 
appraisal of the evidence, implicit or explicit. One section of this report will 
                                                 
13   The word “evidence” is used as a generic term in this document. Strictly speaking, from a 
scientific standpoint, facts supported by means of forensic techniques constitute information or 
leads for the investigation and become evidence once the decision-maker (judge or jury) 
recognises its probative value in relation to the legal issue raised.  
14   See Redmayne (1997, pp. 1028-1035). 
5Champod and Vuille: Scientific Evidence in Europe
Produced by De Gruyter, 2011
therefore focus on the difficulties of interpretation and appraisal. Finally, we 
suggest some ways to facilitate fact-finders’ evaluation of scientific evidence in 
judicial proceedings. Several of our suggestions address the interactions of 
forensic scientists and lawyers, and so may be implemented regardless of the 
general procedural system (accusatorial or inquisitorial) in a particular state.  
2. Case literature 
The increased use of DNA testing in criminal prosecutions in the 1990’s had an 
unexpected side-effect: DNA testing’s promoters had sold it as a fantastic tool for 
identifying perpetrators. In practice, though, it not only identified or ruled out 
actual and prospective defendants as perpetrators at or before trial, but also 
offered a “safe” standard for judicial accuracy against which methods of 
investigation and judicial processes could be measured by examining the cases of 
persons already convicted.  
The Innocence Project15, for example—which used DNA testing to 
exonerate a large number of people serving long prison sentences, highlighted 
dramatic weaknesses in certain traditional types of evidence (witness evidence, 
confessions, etc.), and delineated the problematical effects of occasional faulty 
use of scientific evidence. 
A body of literature has therefore grown up over the last few years 
criticising errors, intentional or not, in the use of scientific evidence. But what is 
the scale of the phenomenon? What forensic disciplines are most affected by 
flaws in theory or practice? And how much credence should really be lent to 
publications adopting what is often a very alarmist tone?  
A few years ago, Donald Kennedy (2003), editor of the prestigious journal 
Science , posed a thought-provoking question: is the combination of the words 
“science” and “forensic” not an oxymoron? In support of this, he noted a blatant 
discrepancy between scientific standards in the field of forensic genetics and the 
lack of structured research and standards as to the reliability of other forensic 
techniques (such as fingerprinting). The question of the existence of scientific 
standards in forensic science persists, as may be seen from the recent report by the 
American National Research Council (2009) (hereinafter: NRC), which describes 
an alarming situation in the majority of forensic sections in American 
laboratories, the only field to stand up to scientific scrutiny being that of forensic 
genetics. We propose to conduct a realistic review of the situation later in this
                                                
15  The Innocence Project is conducted at the Cardozo Law School (Yeshiva University, New 
York, United States) by the lawyers Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld.  Its efforts, along with 
others, have so far made it possible to prove the innocence of 273 wrongly convicted persons, 
including 17 sentenced to death (numbers as of September 7, 2011). 
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 paper, while emphasising the difficulty of formulating solutions solely on the 
basis of anecdotal cases.  
The forensic sciences are not infallible, as three distinct types of research 
point out. Research in the first category typically uses as its point of departure 
cases in which questionable use of scientific evidence potentially contributed to a 
miscarriage of justice. That research may also consider published results of 
performance tests obtained by the forensic laboratories. The second category 
bases its criticisms on results of the introduction of DNA profiling techniques in 
investigation. Finally, the third category approaches the situation from the 
perspective of changes in the rules of admissibility in the United States initiated in 
1993 (Daubert16, Kuhmo Tire17 and Joiner18 cases, departing from the approach 
of the 1923 Frye19 decision). 
2.1. Performance tests 
The first collaborative programmes to test forensic laboratories were established 
in the United States in the 1970’s under the aegis of the LEAA (Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration). The alarming results of these assessments did not 
escape the notice of the judicial community. Several publications have since 
called on parties to adopt a critical, or indeed aggressive, attitude when 
prosecutors introduce technical evidence. The seminal work here is 
Imwinkelried’s (1981, 1992). More recently, the excellent Modern Scientific 
Evidence (Faigman et al., 2007) has become the indispensable source book for 
judges.   
There is no doubt that the results of controlled-situation tests have 
demonstrated the importance of regulation of laboratory procedures. Jonakait 
(1991) observed not only that there could be loopholes in procedures, but, 
furthermore, that training and research, mainly in the traditional forensic science 
fields, were non-existent. The NRC (2009) reached the same conclusion 
concerning a crucial need for regulation two year ago.20 The situation has not 
improved since Jonakait wrote, because of the rapid increase in the number of 
scientific techniques available to courts. Training for judges in these newly-
developed fields has become indispensable to avoid a context in which they 
would be required to accept the findings of scientific experts as an ipse dixit. That 
                                                 
16  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). 
17  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
18  General Electric v. Joiner 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
19  Frye v. United States 293 F 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
20  This report has been the subject of intense discussion and debate both in specialist journals and 
in some major scientific journals such as Nature. See, e.g., Editorial, (2010) ; Gilbert, 2010, 
Neufeld & Scheck, 2010 ; Spinney, 2010). 
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situation has its roots in the earlier parts of the twentieth century, in which the 
task of evaluating the admissibility of scientific evidence lay, for practical 
purposes, with the expert, despite formal legal standards allocating it to the judge. 
The Frye decision established a demarcation line between acceptable and 
unacceptable science based on recognition of the scientific field in question by the 
scientific community concerned. Frye thus established a more restrictive principle 
than the liberal criterion Federal Rule of Evidence 702 adopted in 1975. The lack 
of very specific criteria in the early version of FRE 702 made it an extremely 
flexible rule, opening courtrooms to techniques that relevant scientific 
communities did not recognize, and which had not yet stood the test of time 
(Huber, 1990). 
However, with the last decades of the twentieth century came an explosion 
in legal arguments for the use of technical methods in trials. Scientists and 
lawyers contended that Frye was too selective and vague, preventing or limiting 
prosecutorial use of certain advanced techniques because those techniques had not 
yet obtained the seal of approval of the relevant scientific community concerned 
(Giannelli, 1980). In this connection, Huber (1991a) pointed out the danger that 
some techniques dismissed as “junk science” might be admitted into civil trials. 
Giannelli (1993) noted at around the same time the lack of any real opportunities 
for criminal defendants to develop their own expert scientific evidence, and the 
degree to which the lack of any requirement that the prosecution disclose 
supporting documents limited defense opportunities to dispute such evidence 
offered by the prosecution.  
2.2. The advent of DNA profiling 
The introduction of DNA profiling in courtrooms was gradual and was 
accompanied by heated debate, mainly in the English-speaking countries,21 which 
was eventually settled by two reports by the American NRC (1992, 1996). This 
intense debate – fuelled by certain high-profile cases (Giannelli, 1997) – 
undoubtedly prompted thinking about analytical procedures and their 
accreditation, disclosure practices, defence access to expert resources and the 
need for independent studies. Following publication of the second NRC report 
(1996), controversy over the admissibility of evidence based on forensic genetics 
died down, to the point that DNA testing has become the new standard against 
which the accuracy of forensic techniques is measured (Lynch, 2003).  
In the process, DNA testing has brought to light judicial errors, especially 
under the auspices of the Innocence Project in the United States. Genetic evidence 
                                                
21   See for example (Thompson & Ford, 1990; Thompson, 1993). 
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 has made it possible to exonerate over 200 people, including some on death row 
(Gross, 2008).  
The use of forensic genetics in the courts is still giving rise to criticism in 
publications (Thompson, 2006) highlighting serious errors committed in certain 
laboratories (in Houston, for example). The points which are still under debate, 
and have been since the 1990s (Thompson, 1993, 1995) despite technological 
advances, include :  
• decision-making criteria regarding allele designation in genetic profiles 
(without judgment being influenced by a knowledge of the known profiles 
in the file) (Krane et al., 2008; Thompson, 2009b) ;  
• estimation of the risk of laboratory error and its inclusion in quantified 
assessment of results (Koehler, 1997; Thompson et al., 2003) ; 
• statistical interpretation of DNA mixtures22, also discussed by the UK 
Court of Appeal23; 
• the use of ultrasensitive techniques as in the recently tried Omagh 
Bombing case24 or the Reed, Reed & Garmson case25 ; 
• issues relating to the transfer and persistence of biological fluids, as in the 
Weller26 or Reed & Reed27 cases28.  
 
The dialectic between scientists and commentators is therefore constructive, 
encouraging transparency and recognition of the fact that contamination exists 
and must be controlled through appropriate quality assurance procedures. Finally, 
it is sufficient to bear in mind that, however technologically advanced the tests 
may be, they are performed by human beings who are not infallible and that errors 
can occur despite the existence of a safety net with a very fine mesh due to all the 
protocols that have been put in place (Imwinkelried, 1991). 
                                                 
22   See in particular (Gill et al., 2006; Morling et al., 2007; Gill et al., 2008; Balding & Buckleton, 
2009; Stringer et al., 2009). 
23   R. v. Richard Bates, UK Court of Appeal, [2006] EWCA Crim 1395. 
24   The Queen v. Sean Hoey [2007] NICC 49. See also (Caddy et al., 2008; McCartney, 2008a, 
2008b; Budowle et al., 2009; Gill & Buckleton, 2009). 
25   R. v. David Reed and Terence Reed, R. v. Neil Garmson, UK Court of Appeal, [2009] EWCA 
Crim 2698. 
26   R. v. Peter Weller, UK Court of Appeal, [2010] EWCA Crim 1085. 
27   R. v. David Reed and Terence Reed, R. v. Neil Garmson, UK Court of Appeal, [2009] EWCA 
Crim 2698. 
28    The type of question raised no longer being: “Whose is the DNA found on his fingers?”, but 
“As a result of what activities did this DNA end up on his fingers?”. 
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2.3. New admissibility criteria established by the United States Supreme 
Court 
The third category is comprised of cases establishing the radical new approach 
that the US Supreme Court first employed in the Daubert decision. By 
establishing specific criteria29 (going beyond “general acceptance” of the much 
earlier the Frye decision) all of which the judge must consider in assessing the 
admissibility of scientific evidence, the Court implicitly encouraged lawyers and 
scientists to take a fresh look at all the forensic sciences (even the least 
controversial). Commentators made the implicit encouragement explicit. .30. As 
Jonakait put it (1993-1994, p. 2117) : “If Daubert is taken seriously, then much of 
forensic science is in serious trouble”. From the issuance of Daubert, onwards, 
more and more articles called for approach more in line with the Daubert’s 
scientific criteria in such fields as handwriting and signature analysis31, 
fingerprints32, firearms and tool marks33, and bite marks34. 
In each of these disciplines, there was also a call to refrain from testifying 
to absolute scientific conclusions often based on the vague concept of 
individualisation or uniqueness35, in favour of more modest conclusions 
recognising the sometimes imperfect performances measured in these disciplines. 
Although Collaborative Testing Services (one of the leader in production and 
management of quality tests in forensic science) recently stressed that the error 
rates obtained in the performance tests it administers are not a good indicator of 
the error rate associated with the disciplines concerned (Collaborative Testing 
Services Inc., 2010), Koehler (2008) recommends using these results (following 
appropriate analysis) to help ensure that technical evidence is used in a fully 
informed way. The culmination of this criticism was perhaps the call by Saks and 
Koehler (2005) for a change of paradigm to ensure that the rigour and 
transparency associated with forensic genetics were adopted in all other fields of 
                                                
29   Check (a) whether the theory or technique has been tested; (b) whether it has been subjected to 
peer review and publication; (c) whether the potential error rates associated with the method are 
known; (d) whether the technique is subject to standardised procedures and quality controls; (e) 
whether the technique is accepted by the scientific community concerned. 
30   See in particular (Jonakait, 1991; Saks & Koehler, 1991; Faigman et al., 1994; Saks, 1998; 
Risinger & Saks, 2003). 
31   (Risinger et al., 1989; Risinger & Saks, 1996; Mnookin, 2001b). 
32   (Cole, 2000, 2001; Mnookin, 2001a; Epstein, 2002; Imwinkelried, 2002; Sombat, 2002; Cole, 
2003; Lawson, 2003; Mnookin, 2003; Saks, 2003; Benedict, 2004; Cole, 2004a, 2004b; Steele, 
2004; Cole, 2005a; Schwinghammer, 2005; Zabell, 2005; Cole, 2006a; Meintjes-van der Walt, 
2006; Cole, 2007; Haber & Haber, 2008; Mnookin, 2008; Haber & Haber, 2009). 
33   (Steele, 2002 ; Schwartz, 2004, 2005; Nichols, 2007; Schwartz, 2007). 
34   (Pretty & Sweet, 2001; Kieser, 2005; Bowers, 2006). 
35   See in this connection (McLachlan, 1995; Saks & Koehler, 2008; Champod, 2009; Cole, 2009; 
Kaye, 2009a; Kaye, 2010). 
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 forensic science. These conclusions were eventually incorporated into the latest 
NRC report (2009).  
2.4. “Causes célèbres” in the different areas of forensic science  
A series of “causes célèbres” have fuelled this move towards an increased 
scrutiny of forensic science practices. Some illustrations of the problems 
encountered in several forensic fields: 
 
Biological traces: A case preceding the use of forensic DNA analysis is that of 
Lindy and Michael Chamberlain in Australia, who were convicted of 
murder on the basis of a faulty interpretation of blood stains in their car and 
tears in their child’s clothing (Morling, 1987). This case contributed to the 
founding of the National Institute of Forensic Science36 in Australia, as did 
the Pratt case, which involved highly questionable use of microtraces 
(paint, fragments, etc.) (Shannon, 1984). The Preece case37 in Scotland 
brought out the need for rules of disclosure in relation to technical evidence. 
In this case, the expert (Dr Clift) omitted to mention the results of 
serological analyses on the victim’s body fluids. These results put into 
perspective the positive results obtained for Preece.  
 
The use of DNA evidence did not eliminate such errors, as shown by Fred 
Zain’s deliberate falsification of DNA evidence (Giannelli, 2005) and by the 
recent practices of several American laboratories, including the one in 
Houston, making little use of accredited protocols (Giannelli, 2007; 
Thompson, 2008). 
 
Bite marks: The Krone case (Bowers, 1996; Anonymous, 2002) and the Brooks 
and Brewer cases38, handled by the highly controversial Dr West, are 
perfect examples of exaggeration in the interpretation of technical evidence, 
lending it an associative strength going far beyond what is scientifically 
acceptable.  
 
Finger marks: Over 20 cases of wrong associations were documented by Cole 
(Cole, 2005b, 2006b). The recent Mayfield case, in which a mark detected 
during the investigation of the Madrid bomb attacks in 2004 was wrongly 
matched up to him by three FBI experts and an independent expert, has 
                                                 
36   http://www.nifs.com.au/ 
37   Preece v H.M. Advocate [1981] Crim.L.R. 783. 
38   http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=4311309&page=1 
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been the subject of several published inquiries39. Cole says that this is 
possibly only the tip of the iceberg.  
The Mayfield case also serves to highlight the risks posed by cognitive bias, 
which may, on several levels, taint the decisions taken by a forensic 
expert40. The report by the Office of the Inspector General (2006) states that 
the repetition of the four errors can be partly accounted for by the fact that 
the three experts who conducted their comparative examinations after the 
first expert were perfectly aware of the latter’s final conclusion. Cognitive 
bias would therefore seem to have contributed to misidentification in this 
case. The lack of a mechanism for reducing context effects on operators was 
also identified in the NRC report (2009) as a major source of concern, 
especially in fields (such as fingerprinting or handwriting and signature 
analysis) with a large comparative component left entirely to an expert’s 
judgment41. 
Comparative hair analysis: Many cases of dubious associations have been 
highlighted in the Innocence Project (Giannelli, 2002). The Guy Paul Morin 
case discussed below is also significant in this respect. 
Comparative fibre analysis: Among other factors, evidence based on comparative 
analysis of fibres (fibres found on the victim matching the carpet in the 
suspect’s car) and of hair played a significant part in the conviction of Guy 
Paul Morin in Canada. Morin was acquitted by the Ontario Court of Appeal 
after DNA analysis had shown that the traces of sperm found on the 
murdered child’s underwear could not be his. A public inquiry headed by 
Kaufman revealed major shortcomings in laboratory work and interaction 
between experts, police and judges with regard to hair and fibre evidence 
(Kaufman, 1998). As regards specifically the results of comparative hair 
analysis, the report by the committee of inquiry notes that the use by experts 
of vague conclusions such as “the hair might come from…”, “the fibres are 
consistent with…” or “the fibres match”, which lend themselves to a range 
of interpretations, was one of the causes leading to the attribution of 
                                                
39   The reports connected with the Mayfield case are as follows: (Stacey, 2004; Smrz et al., 2006; 
United States Department of Justice & Office of the Inspector General - Oversight and Review 
Division, 2006; United States Department of Justice & Office of the Inspector General - Oversight 
and Review Division, 2011). 
40  On cognitive risks, see Dror (2009), Thompson (2009a) and Dror & Cole (2010) and the 
relevant references. 
41  The field of forensic genetics is not immune to the risk of cognitive bias (Thompson, 1995; 
Krane et al., 2008), but the problem is less salient that in the more traditional areas of forensic 
science. 
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 disproportionate probative value to evidence which actually made only a 
limited contribution to the establishment of the facts. Where fibres are 
concerned, in addition to the fact that the experts provided both the inquiry 
and the trial court with flawed information, serious problems of 
contamination were brought to light. Even more seriously, subsequent 
technical evidence supporting the defence’s line of argument was, 
conveniently, not disclosed.  
 
Comparative bullet lead analysis: Following the doubts voiced by Tobin (a former 
FBI specialist) about the technique used (Imwinkelried & Tobin, 2003; 
Tobin, 2004), an investigation conducted by a committee of the NRC 
(National Research Council - Committee on Scientific Assessment of Bullet 
Lead Elemental Composition Comparison, 2004) and a debate in the 
specialist literature42, the technique used routinely by the FBI was quite 
simply abandoned owing to the lack of an adequate validation procedure. 
 
Fire investigation: The Willingham case (Grann, 2009), still under investigation in 
Texas, offers some alarming indicators regarding the quality of the 
techniques used during the investigation.  
 
Explosive residue analysis (Schurr, 1993): The Judith Ward43, Birmingham Six44 
and Maguire Seven45 cases in the United Kingdom are emblematic of the 
errors committed in the 1970s in analysis of explosive residues - and 
specifically, in all these cases, nitro-glycerine: an expert whose competence 
was disputed (Dr Skuse), experts lacking objectivity and failing in their duty 
of transparency (Mr Elliott & Mr Higgs), unspecific method of 
characterisation, contamination of samples, lack of declared and 
standardised protocols, lack of disclosure.  
The Maguire Seven case was the subject of a public inquiry (May Inquiry), 
which was subsequently transformed into the Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice (Runciman Report (1993)). The findings led to substantial 
changes in the rules of disclosure, the setting up of a forensic service 
independent of the prosecuting authorities (now the Forensic Science 
Service Ltd) and the setting up of the Criminal Cases Review Commission 
(CCRC) and its Scottish counterpart, the SCCRC (Nobles & Schiff, 2001). 
 
                                                 
42   See the following articles: (Finkelstein & Levin, 2005; Thompson, 2005; Kaye, 2006; Kaasa et 
al., 2007). 
43   R v Ward (1993) 96 Cr. App. R. 1. 
44   R. v. McIlkenny (1991), 93 Cr. App. R. 287 (C.A.). 
45   R. v. Maguire & Ors. (1992), 94 Cr. App. R. 133. 
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Ear mark analysis: In the Dallagher46 and Kempster47 cases, ear marks (found at 
the crime scene) were used as the only means of identifying the two 
suspects. In both cases, the Court of Appeal, without stating that the 
technical evidence was inadmissible under UK case-law, nevertheless urged 
caution in assessing its associative strength. The subsequent DNA analysis 
in the Dallagher case (the DNA profile obtained from the ear print did not 
match Dallagher’s) certainly played a large part in the authorities’ decision 
to discontinue the proceedings. But it would be wrong to see the results of 
this analysis as incontrovertible proof of Dallagher’s innocence48. 
Comparative analysis of body odours by dogs: The technique of training dogs to 
recognise individuals (in identity parades) on the basis of odour samples 
taken at the crime scene is used in a number of European countries, notably 
in Poland, France and the Netherlands. The increased use of these 
techniques by credible bodies might lead one to believe that the results 
(positive or negative) have very great probative force. Nevertheless, several 
commentators advise caution49. 
Submission of a statistical argument to the court: Meintjes-van der Walt (2001, p. 
166) gives a perfect summing-up of the issues involved: “The problem 
surrounding experts expressing probabilities in such a way that they trespass 
on the ultimate issue is however an issue that decision-makers should give 
careful consideration to when evaluating such evidence”. The proper 
presentation of a statistical argument, such as, for example, the probabilities 
associated with the results of a comparison of genetic profiles, is not an easy 
matter, from both the expert’s and the court’s point of view. The UK Court 
of Appeal gave some guidelines following the Deen case and especially the 
                                                
R. v. Mark Dallagher, UK Court of Appeal - Criminal Division, [2002] EWCA Crim 1903. 
46   R. v. Mark J. Kempster, UK Court of Appeal - Criminal Division, [2003] EWCA Crim 3555.  
R. v. Mark J. Kempster, UK Court of Appeal - Criminal Division, [2008] EWCA Crim 975. 
46   See in this connection the article by Schiffer & Champod (2008). 
46 Refer to the following articles: (Broeders, 2006; Tomaszewski & Girdwoyn, 2006; 
Wojcikiewicz, 2009). 
46   R v Alan James Doheny, R v Gary Adams, UK Court of Appeal - Criminal Division, [1996] 
EWCA Crim 728. 
46   The following two articles provide a detailed explanation of this error of reasoning; Balding et 
Donnelly (1994) et Leung (2002).46   R. v. Mark Dallagher, UK Court of Appeal - Criminal 
Division, [2002] EWCA Crim 1903. 
47   R. v. Mark J. Kempster, UK Court of Appeal - Criminal Division, [2003] EWCA Crim 3555.  
R. v. Mark J. Kempster, UK Court of Appeal - Criminal Division, [2008] EWCA Crim 975. 
48   See in this connection the article by Schiffer & Champod (2008). 
49 Refer to the following articles: (Broeders, 2006; Tomaszewski & Girdwoyn, 2006; 
Wojcikiewicz, 2009). 
14 International Commentary on Evidence Vol. 9, No. 1, Article 1
 Doheny & Adams cases50. Forensic genetics experts are urged to take 
account of these recommendations and to avoid falling into the now clearly 
identified but, unfortunately, still common trap of the “prosecutor’s fallacy” 
or the “inversion fallacy”51. The US Supreme Court, ruling in the McDaniel 
et al. v. Brown case52, recently acknowledged the danger of this error, 
which leads to overestimation of the real significance of technical evidence 
(Kaye, 2009b). The Keir case53 in Australia is another good example of this. 
 The situation is by no means clarified in the other countries, leaving ample 
scope for error. This is a major source of concern, which is manifest in all 
cases where the statistical argument carries significant weight. Recent cases 
in which experts were called upon to express an opinion on the probability 
of occurrence of multiple sudden infant deaths (eg the Sally Clark54 or 
Angela Cannings55 cases in the United Kingdom) have shown once again 
how essential it is for the court to be able to assess figures without 
committing syllogistic errors that can result in undue importance being 
attached to the statistical argument. A similar situation arose in the case of 
Lucia de Berk in the Netherlands, resulting in an acquittal in April 2010 
(Lucy, 2006; Meester et al., 2006).  
2.5. Forensic science as a source of judicial error? 
The above-mentioned British and American cases (Giannelli, 2007; Garrett & 
Neufeld, 2009) and Canadian cases (MacFarlane, 2006) are regularly cited, along 
with other incidents, in the literature on judicial errors. All the studies on this 
subject reflect ambivalent feelings with regard to expert scientific opinion.  
On the one hand, the forensic sciences have been identified as a leading 
cause in the error process. Obvious shortcomings are generally noticeable with 
regard to training, the quality of scientific protocols or assessment of the actual 
significance of technical evidence. The catalogue of causes, involving technical 
elements to varying degrees, has alarmed a number of observers. However, the 
                                                 
50   R v Alan James Doheny, R v Gary Adams, UK Court of Appeal - Criminal Division, [1996] 
EWCA Crim 728. 
51   The following two articles provide a detailed explanation of this error of reasoning; Balding et 
Donnelly (1994) et Leung (2002). 
52   McDaniel, Warden, et al. v. Troy Brown, Supreme Court of the United States, 558 U.S. (2010). 
53   R. v Keir, Supreme Court of New South Wales (Court of Criminal Appeal), CCA 60092/00 SC 
70049/98. 
54   R v Sally Clark, UK Court of Appeal - Criminal Division, [2003] EWCA Crim 1020. The case 
is well described in (Johnson, 2004; Nobles & Schiff, 2005). 
55   R v Angela Cannings, UK Court of Appeal - Criminal Division, [2004] EWCA Crim 1. 
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number of such cases56 should be kept in perspective and viewed in relation to all 
the other criminal or civil cases deriving benefit from the forensic sciences.  
On the other, the forensic sciences have been instrumental in discovering 
judicial errors. Advances in DNA testing have much to do with this57. These 
technical advances have led to changes in the rules in the United States, enabling 
sentenced persons to apply for their cases to be reopened.  
Before we go further with our analysis, however, it should be noted, as 
Edmond (2002) has already done, that analysis of scientific contributions as a 
cause of judicial error has been essentially asymmetrical in that it has shown 
greater severity in examining evidence against the defendant, in order to highlight 
any weaknesses in it, and has been generous in admitting exonerating evidence, 
displaying little rigour in testing its reliability and, consequently, (relatively) 
easily accepting the person’s innocence. Now, while the asymmetry of this 
reasoning may be justified from a legal point of view - a position which we do not 
endorse58 - because the evidentiary requirements are themselves unequal in 
criminal cases59 it is indefensible from a scientific standpoint. Consequently, as 
Thompson (2008) points out, everyone in the criminal-law system has found it 
very reassuring to be able to lay the blame on a few black sheep and to propose 
individual actions rather than undertake a systematic analysis focusing not solely 
on individuals, but on the system in its entirety. Schiffer (2009) reaches the same 
conclusion. 
Modern scientific techniques bring unquestionable benefits to the judicial 
system, but these techniques must be employed in an appropriate scientific and 
legal framework. The report by Canadian prosecutors revisits a number of judicial 
errors and restates some self-evident proposals for the forensic sciences (Heads of 
Prosecutions Committee Working Group, 2004): the need for courts to properly 
assess the role of experts and not allow them to usurp their decision-making role, 
the need to obtain appropriate conclusions in expert reports (without exaggerating 
their contribution) and the existence of providers of expert forensic opinions 
outside state channels. MacFarlane (2006) notes the need for a special assessment 
in admissibility proceedings when the technical evidence is based on new 
technologies. We will take up these points again later. 
                                                
56  Saks & Koehler (2005) give a large percentage (63%) of cases of judicial error where the 
forensic sciences were at fault. This figure was quickly put in perspective by Collins and Jarvis 
(2009). 
57   See in this connection (National Institute of Justice, 1996; Garrett, 2008; Garrett & Neufeld, 
2009). 
58   We believe that the reliability of incriminating and exonerating evidence should be examined 
in a similar way, this issue being independent of that of the decision threshold.  
59   The prosecution must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt (which means that 
the judge or jury must be personally convinced thereof), while the defence only has to instil 
reasonable doubt in order to secure acquittal.  
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 3. Dealing with evidence in criminal justice systems of the accusatorial 
and inquisitorial traditions 
3.1. General structures 
The aim of this section is to give a brief description of the two main kinds of 
procedural arrangements in use in European states60. Although the distinction is 
exaggerated, with a good number of legal systems borrowing from the other kind, 
it does seem vital to give thought to the structure of legal systems before taking a 
critical approach to the interpretation of scientific evidence by lawyers. 
In a legal system of the accusatorial tradition, the prosecution and 
defence present two versions of the facts to a jury which is required to decide 
which of the two versions is accurate. The judge acts as a mediator: his or her role 
is primarily passive and reactive. The impetus to take the investigation forward is 
thus provided by the parties, which bear responsibility for adducing evidence in 
support of their position (producing substantive evidence, having their witnesses 
and expert witnesses interviewed). A complex body of rules determines which 
evidence is admissible and which must be excluded from the proceedings. A set 
of rules on disclosure also ensures that each party is aware of the information 
needed for the trial to be prepared fairly. The proceedings are mainly oral, and the 
trial holds a central position, as it is only at that stage that the jury takes 
cognisance of the case. The witnesses (including experts) are directly examined 
and cross-examined by the parties during the proceedings. 
In a legal system of the inquisitorial tradition, the investigation is 
conducted by an examining judge, who seeks incriminating and exonerating 
evidence with a view to establishing the truth; he or she collects substantive 
evidence, interviews witnesses and appoints experts if that proves to be necessary. 
The system is governed by the principle of freedom of evidence, according to 
which all forms of evidence are a priori admissible, with just a few exceptions. 
The examining judge has in his or her possession the case-file containing all the 
documents relating to the proceedings and all the accumulated evidence, and this 
file can be consulted by all the parties. This preliminary phase, which is secret, 
written and non-adversarial, is sometimes61 followed by an oral, public and 
adversarial phase: the examining judge then forwards the case-file to a (different) 
judge who, or to a court which, holds proceedings based mainly on the material 
                                                 
60   We refer to this distinction between accusatorial and inquisitorial systems because these terms 
are convenient, but we are aware that some writers prefer to call the latter either a "mixed system" 
or the "reformed system" and use the adjective "inquisitorial" only when referring to the secret 
written procedure used in mainland Europe from the 13th century onwards (Damaška, 1973, pp. 
556-557). 
61   In practice, the examining judge is, in certain legal systems, empowered to convict in a number 
of less serious cases, thus bringing these cases to an end at that point. 
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already in the file, of which the judge/court will therefore have prior knowledge. 
The judge/court can also decide to take further evidence, if insufficient 
information is considered to be available to reach a verdict. During the trial, 
witnesses and experts are usually examined by the judge, who thus has an active 
role and takes a more directive approach. 
3.2. Dealing with evidence 
When it comes to collecting and dealing with evidence in general, the benefits and 
drawbacks that the two systems are generally considered to have are set out 
below. 
In inquisitorial systems: 
• the neutrality of the investigation depends on the impartiality of the 
examining judge responsible for the case; 
• the contribution of the defence to the building of the case is limited, a 
corollary of the examining judge's neutrality being that the parties have a 
limited power of investigation of their own62; 
• since the judge/court has prior knowledge of the case before the trial, 
some people perceive a risk of bias, one all the higher for the fact that a 
neutral judge conducted the investigation before him or her and considered 
that the incriminating evidence was sufficient for committal for trial; 
• during the trial, the parties cannot cross-examine the witnesses and experts 
giving evidence unfavourable to them, and this is sometimes deemed to 
deprive them of an effective means of challenging those persons’ 
credibility63; 
• the defence generally has complete knowledge of the case-file and the 
evidence gathered64. Although further evidence may be adduced by the 
                                               
62   Coercive measures (searches, telephone tapping, etc) being prohibited to them. Also 
sometimes prohibited to them is contact with witnesses outside the procedural framework; 
otherwise Bar ethics discourage this practice. It is always open to the defence to offer evidence, 
which may be refused by the examining judge on the grounds that it is not relevant or that the facts 
have already been sufficiently proven. This brings us back to the concept of assessment of 
evidence at an early stage, which may, in our opinion, be problematic when that evidence is 
scientific, as such evidence is widely assumed to be accurate, and it will often be difficult for the 
defence to demonstrate the merits of a challenge to the accuracy thereof. 
63   Questions are put mainly by the judge, who may authorise counsel to address the persons being 
interviewed directly. In such a case, however, counsel are expected to show restraint, and there is 
no cross-examination as such, comparable to that in accusatorial systems. 
64   This statement nevertheless has to be qualified: in practice, the defendant's right of access to 
the file at certain stages of the procedure and right to participate in dealing with evidence 
(including expert report writing activities) may be restricted by certain legal systems. 
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 parties or requested by the court during the hearing, the surprise effect is 
not part of such a judicial culture. 
 
In accusatorial systems: 
 
• the role that the defence is able to play in the investigation is theoretically 
greater; 
• the role of the defence is nevertheless frequently limited in practice by the 
resources at the defendant’s disposal65; 
• some investigative acts can be carried out only by the public authority 
(such as conducting a search). Thus, de facto, the two parties are not in the 
same position66; 
• cross-examination is considered to be a very effective means of testing the 
credibility of witnesses; 
• examination of witnesses and experts by the parties directly may bring a 
risk of their evidence being distorted for the examiner’s own purposes, 
especially if the persons under examination, while competent in their own 
field, are inexperienced in the art of public speaking (as is typical of 
scientific experts); 
• the arrangements for disclosure of information are asymmetrical67, which 
is not conducive to a transparent assessment of scientific evidence68. 
                                                 
65   It is clearly understood that persons in financial hardship may benefit from free legal aid, and 
that this may cover the costs of any expert report. Such persons will, however, be in a weaker 
position than the prosecution when it comes to commissioning an expert report or a second expert 
report, since the costs thereby incurred always entail a risk of financial loss, and the degree of 
inclination to take such a risk depends on the level of financial resources available. 
66   Spencer (2002a, p. 626) drew the conclusion that, in England, "the duty to look for evidence 
for the defence belongs to nobody", and points out that, in order to alleviate this shortcoming, a 
"public defender" exists in certain Australian and American jurisdictions, with a status equivalent 
to that of the public prosecutor, and he or she is responsible for this task when the defendant so 
requests. 
67   In practice, the prosecution service in the United Kingdom has, since 2003, been required to 
communicate to the defence the material collected during the investigation which might have an 
influence on the outcome of the case (principle of relevance), and this applies even if the material 
concerned is not presented as evidence at the trial. The defence, for its part, has to communicate to 
the prosecution its main arguments relating both to the facts and to the law. The prosecution must 
then reconsider the relevance of additional information on the basis of the defence arguments 
presented by the accused and, if need be, communicate this (Durston, 2008, p 55; Sommer, 2009, 
p 146). 
68   We agree with the idea that, where scientific expert reports are concerned, disclosure should be 
symmetrical and complete. To this end, expert reports should be as full as is possible (Meintjes-
van der Walt, 2003, p. 93). 
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3.3. Scientific evidence in particular 
Where the use of scientific experts more specifically is concerned, different 
solutions have been adopted for the two systems69. 
Accusatorial systems rely first and foremost70 on presentations by experts 
chosen by the parties, instructed and financed by them, having the same status as 
witnesses71. The main advantages and drawbacks in terms of scientific evidence 
which this procedural structure is acknowledged to have are set out below72. 
• the system masks areas of agreement between good scientists and 
encourages arguments between expert witnesses well trained in rhetoric; 
• expert witnesses cannot convey their results freely, for this is always done 
through an examination or cross-examination, and is therefore always 
distorted in one direction or another; it should be pointed out in this 
context that, in such a system, written reports submitted by experts are 
traditionally brief, by which is meant largely factual, since it is during the 
adversarial proceedings that the contribution of the technical material in 
the case will be discussed and will take shape; 
• the system is more exposed to the risk of evidence being given by 
(knowingly or unwittingly73) biased expert witnesses; 
• expert witnesses are chosen for their ability to impress the court74, and not 
for their scientific skills; 
• the defence needs to have sufficient financial resources to be able to use 
expert witnesses with a reputation as good as prosecution experts’; 
                                               
69   Although the dividing lines between them are not hermetic. While the Italian procedure is 
accusatorial, experts can be appointed by the authority (and the parties may also have consulenti 
tecnici). 
70   Courts in the United Kingdom also make use of experts whom they appoint during the 
sentencing phase (Spencer, 2002a, p 633), and courts in the United States have for many years 
been able to call on the services of an independent scientific adviser in order to establish the facts, 
although they rarely do so (Black et al., 1994, p 793). 
71   Although their field of action is greater than that of witnesses, since they can inter alia give 
their opinion (and not merely recount the facts), state the opinion of their scientific colleagues 
(notwithstanding the prohibition of hearsay evidence), make their statement in written form 
(something rarely allowed for other witnesses, who have to comply with the principle of 
immediacy) and be paid. On this subject, see Alldridge (1999, p 149). 
72   On these matters, see Spencer (1992), Alldridge (1999) and Lucas (1989). 
73   It also has to be borne in mind that the expert witness has received instructions from one of the 
parties and is not therefore certain to receive all the relevant information about the question raised. 
74   Spencer (1992) goes as far as to claim that the skills of the convincing expert witness and the 
good scientist are irreconcilable, for the former has to be self-confident and sure of his or her 
results, and uphold these under cross-examination, whereas the latter’s main quality is open-
mindedness. 
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 • the accusatorial system theoretically makes it possible to cast effective 
doubt on any questionable statements made by the expert of one of the 
parties; 
• if expert witnesses can potentially be perceived as the parties' "hired 
guns", science loses its capacity to persuade, whereas it is precisely for its 
reliability that science is used by the justice system; 
• cross-examination is an inappropriate way of sorting the wheat from the 
chaff where scientific evidence is concerned: the expert witness’s 
cognitive capacities (perception and memory), motivation and prejudice 
are frequently not in doubt, but the methodology itself may be biased and 
give false results75. 
 
As for inquisitorial systems, most use official experts, sometimes included on 
lists or from accredited laboratories, appointed by an examining judge or the 
court76 and working under their supervision77, with a status superior to that of 
witnesses. The parties are not completely cut off from the expert reporting 
process, since it is sometimes possible for them to request that certain specific 
questions be put to the expert (and therefore certain tests carried out)78, to make 
comments on the expert's report once it has been placed in the case-file, to raise 
supplementary questions and possibly request the appointment of an expert to 
                                                 
75  Black, Ayala & Saffran-Brinks (1994, p 789). 
76   However, not everyone who has scientific knowledge and works on a criminal investigation 
has expert status. In French law, in fact, the scene-of-crime officer who takes the first samples and 
carries out the first tests during an investigation does not have the status of an expert, as he or she 
has not been appointed by a court. The expert proper is the person who subsequently comments on 
the work done by the scene-of-crime officer (Spencer, 1992, p. 227). In Swiss law, the status of 
these officers is uncertain. The new Federal Code of Criminal Procedure (which comes into force 
on 1 January 2011) seems to settle the issue by making them subject to a more flexible expert 
reporting system (Vuille, 2010). The appropriateness of this regulation is nevertheless 
questionable. In practice, some officers make use of this distinction to evade unpleasant questions 
which might be put to them, relying specifically on their lack of expert status in the strict sense. In 
accusatorial systems, however, this difference does not exist, and all scientific officers are in the 
same position, whether they are involved in the procedure during the investigation phase or only 
during the trial. 
77  Some inquisitorial systems allow the parties to make use of "private experts" taken on, 
instructed and paid by them. In such cases, provision is made for them to participate in the 
procedure, which grants them a status which may or may not be equivalent to that of the official 
experts. Other inquisitorial systems are silent about scientific advisers taken on by the parties, and 
here the court receives reports by such persons as mere arguments by a party, is not obliged to 
interview them at the hearing and, if applicable, may decide to interview them as mere witnesses. 
Italian law provides for scientific advisers to be appointed for each of the parties, and they work 
with the official expert (Art 230 CPP/Italy). Nota: CPP stands for Criminal Procedures Code. 
78   Art 165 CPP/France, Art 184 CPP/Switzerland.  
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give a second opinion79, to request the expert at the hearing to clarify material 
which is still unclear80, and to have their own private expert interviewed. The 
main advantages and drawbacks of these systems are set out below81. 
• there is a risk that a court may place a considerable amount of trust in 
incompetent experts, protected by their special status from acrimonious 
attacks by the defence82; 
• in certain fields of expertise83, this problem is counterbalanced by a 
system of accreditation (or official lists) intended to guarantee the 
competence and reliability of the scientists who assist the justice system. 
In practice, however, these accreditations sometimes create a situation in 
which the best qualified experts work exclusively with the prosecuting 
authorities, not only depriving the defence of valuable resources, but also, 
over the longer term, raising questions as to their neutrality, and may at 
the very least give rise to an impression that an obstacle is being placed in 
the way of the defence; 
• the parties may raise questions throughout the procedure, giving the expert 
an opportunity to reconsider his or her position calmly and impartially (in 
his or her own office or that of an examining judge84), and this, in our 
opinion, is beneficial. 
In the next section, we shall study the principle of equality of arms and the 
procedural stages during which it may be infringed when scientific evidence is 
being dealt with. The European Convention on Human Rights is binding on states 
which have different procedural traditions, whether accusatorial or inquisitorial, 
and is therefore implicitly based on the idea that the structure of the judicial 
system is not in itself a relevant factor in the context of compliance with the 
                                                
79   Which will be all the easier to obtain if the defence successfully argues about the shortcomings 
of the initial expert report. This is an area which is certainly crucial where equality of arms is 
concerned. 
80   Art 168 CPP/France. 
81   On these questions, see Spencer (1992) and Alldridge (1999). 
82   Spencer (2002a, p 634). 
83   In Switzerland, for example, DNA tests can be carried out only by one of the six laboratories 
accredited by the Federal Department of Justice and Police. But there is no system of accreditation 
for many other fields of scientific expertise. In France, in contrast, all the experts involved in court 
proceedings have to go through a relatively cumbersome procedure in order to be included on the 
official lists of experts (Art 157 CPP/France; in exceptional cases on the basis of a reasoned 
decision, an expert whose name is not on the list may nevertheless be chosen). 
84   Spencer (1992), p 232. 
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 principle of equality of arms. The two kinds of system are deemed to be equally 
capable of guaranteeing a fair trial85. 
However, as we have tried to show in the preceding paragraphs, use is 
made of scientific experts according to a different logic in the two systems, and 
the problems associated with the preparation and interpretation of scientific 
evidence arise to varying degrees, depending on whether the expert has been 
appointed by the authority or commissioned by one of the parties. As we give 
thought to the use of science by the justice system, therefore, we cannot leave 
completely out of consideration the procedure in which it takes place, although, as 
we shall explain below, a large portion of the problems that this raises can be 
resolved by setting minimum requirements in respect of the substance and 
assessment of expert reports in both systems.  
 
4. Equality of arms 
 
4.1. Concept 
 
Equality of arms is a principle which derives from the guarantee of a fair trial86. It 
requires equality between the parties in procedural terms, meaning that each of 
them must have a reasonable opportunity to present its case in conditions which 
do not place it at a clear disadvantage vis-à-vis the other parties87. Equality of 
arms is not in itself a right, but a principle intended to ensure that the parties' 
rights are realised in a balanced manner. The parties must also have the right of 
equal access to relevant information88 and an equal opportunity to have their say 
and present their arguments and observations, and their scientific experts must be 
given equivalent status89. The concept does not, however, have absolute scope. 
According to settled case-law, equality of arms is a matter to be assessed on a 
concrete basis (ie in each individual case), and with the procedure as a whole 
being taken into account (and not each part thereof)90. 
                                                 
85   Summers (2006, p 104). 
86    ECHR, case of Delcourt v. Belgium of 17 January 1970, § 28; ECHR, case of Brandstetter v. 
Austria of 28 August 1991, § 66.  
87   ECHR, case of Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands of 27 October 1993, § 33. Thus the 
perspective is a comparative one, and the principle is not violated if both parties were deprived to 
an equivalent extent of the opportunity to act (Trechsel, 2005, p 97). 
88   Subject to the disclosure arrangements in accusatorial systems. In inquisitorial systems, all 
relevant information is collated in the case-file, to which the parties have access (sometimes 
subject to restrictions at certain stages of the procedure). 
89   ECHR, case of Brandstetter v. Austria of 28 August 1991. 
90   ECHR, case of Mantovanelli v. France of 17 February 1997. 
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Related to the concept of equality of arms91 is the principle of adversarial 
proceedings, implying first and foremost the defendant's right to be present at the 
different stages of the procedure92, and, secondly, the right of the defence to an 
opportunity to have knowledge of and consider the arguments of the opposing 
party93 and, in particular, to comment on the evidence presented94. 
4.2. The expert's position in the procedure and its effect on equality of arms 
The concept of equality of arms thus implies a comparative study of the 
respective positions of the parties in the procedure. In a system of the accusatorial 
tradition, in which each of the parties appoints its own experts, this means that the 
defence expert must be placed on the same footing as his or her prosecution 
counterpart95. And in an inquisitorial system? While the prosecution certainly is 
the defence's "opposing party", what is the status of an expert appointed by the 
court? 
In an inquisitorial system, the expert is regarded as theoretically neutral96, 
irrespective of whether his or her conclusions incriminate the defendant or are 
favourable to him or her. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 
however, has ruled in a number of judgments involving inquisitorial-type 
procedures that the defence had been placed in a disadvantageous position and 
                                                
91   Both are component parts of the right to a fair trial. This distinction, while useful in the civil 
context, may seem somewhat theoretical in the criminal framework, since the evidence which the 
defence may wish to challenge is always presented by the prosecution, and the two principles are 
therefore violated simultaneously (Summers, 2006, p 119). 
92   A principle to which there are, however, some exceptions, particularly in appeal courts.  
93   It has been deemed incompatible with the principle of adversarial proceedings for the 
prosecutor to decide unilaterally not to disclose certain information in order to protect a paramount 
public interest; a court ruling has to be issued on this subject (ECHR, case of Rowe and Davis v. 
the United Kingdom of 16 February 2000, § 66-67). On the other hand, if the defence is informed 
of the existence of the evidence and has the opportunity to challenge the court's decision 
authorising non-disclosure, the principle has not been violated. 
94   ECHR, case of Brandstetter v. Austria of 28 August 1991, § 66-67; ECHR, case of Rowe and 
Davis v. the United Kingdom of 16 February 2000, § 60. 
95   For instance, if the prosecution expert has the right to examine a witness or another expert 
directly, the defence expert must be given the same right. 
96   Although Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal without specifying any requirement for experts to meet the 
same standards, the European Court of Human Rights recognises that the conclusions of an expert 
appointed by that tribunal may well have considerable influence on its decision. In this context, an 
expert's lack of neutrality may violate the principle of equality of arms. As in respect of the 
tribunal, the question of impartiality is therefore examined from two angles: in the subjective 
sphere, a judge's personal impartiality is presumed to exist until it is proved otherwise. Irrespective 
of the judge's attitude, however, if one of the parties entertains doubts as to his or her impartiality, 
the question has to be asked of whether these doubts are objectively justified. 
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 that equality of arms had therefore been violated, since no corrective action had 
been taken. 
In its judgment in the case of Eggertsdottir v. Iceland97, the Court 
considered whether the composition of the body of experts gave rise to legitimate 
fears of prevention of equality. The applicant in that case complained about the 
membership of the body which had supplied to the Icelandic Supreme Court an 
expert opinion on the possible causal relationship between alleged failures by the 
medical profession and the disability from which she suffered. The body 
concerned (the SMLB, State Medico-Legal Board), acting on the court's 
instructions, was made up of nine members, four of whom were employed at the 
hospital where the events had occurred, although they had played no part in these. 
Three of them were also members of the Forensic Chamber to which the Board 
had previously referred the matter for examination. The European Court of 
Human Rights considered that this situation gave rise to understandable 
apprehensions in the applicant as to the impartiality of the court, and that these 
apprehensions were objectively justified, in so far as the members of the SMLB 
had not only been instructed to give an opinion on a certain issue, an opinion 
which might or might not have differed from the opinion previously expressed by 
their National and University Hospital colleagues or the Chief Medical Executive, 
but had also been instructed to assess their colleagues' acts, while knowing that 
the Chief Medical Executive had already supported those colleagues in a 
document written in reaction to the judgment at first instance. Furthermore, it 
emerged from the judgment of the Icelandic Supreme Court that the SMLB’s 
expert opinion had carried significant weight in its decision. Equality of arms had 
thus been violated. 
The Court also recognised a violation of the principle of equality of arms 
in the case of Stoimenov v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia98. The 
defendant had been prosecuted for production of, and trade in, narcotic 
substances. The products seized, which the defendant denied were narcotics, had 
been analysed by a laboratory attached to the Ministry of the Interior, which had 
found evidence against the defendant on the basis of reports supplied by an expert 
concluding that the substance was indeed opium. The applicant had asked for a 
second expert opinion, on the grounds that the expert was not independent and 
that there were doubts as to the accuracy of the reports. This request was 
dismissed. The domestic court convicted the applicant, largely on the basis of the 
expert reports. The Court took the view that the expert should be considered to be 
the prosecution's expert, since he had not been appointed by a court, but by the 
Ministry of the Interior, ie the authority which subsequently initiated the 
prosecution, and that the applicant should have been allowed a second expert 
                                                 
97   ECHR, case of Sara Lind Eggertsdottir v. Iceland of 5 July 2007. 
98   ECHR, case of Stoimenov v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of 5 April 2007.  
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report. He had in practice had no opportunity to have the products at issue 
analysed by a private scientific expert, as the products had been confiscated by the 
authority. 
In the judgment in the case of Bönisch v. Austria99, the Court recognised a 
violation of the principle of equality of arms because the expert (a scientist later 
appointed as expert by the court) had set in motion the criminal prosecution and 
should therefore have been considered to be a prosecution expert, and 
consequently the expert presented by the defence should have been placed on an 
equal footing with him, which had not been the case, as the defence expert had 
been interviewed as a mere witness, whereas the prosecution expert had been 
interviewed as an expert and allowed to attend the hearings, put questions to the 
defendant and to witnesses and comment on their evidence. 
The situation was different, on the other hand, in the case of Brandstetter 
v. Austria100. The court had appointed an expert and subsequently refused to 
interview any other expert but him. The expert instructed by the court belonged to 
the same institute as the person who had set in motion the criminal action, but the 
Court refused to regard him as a prosecution expert, because the defence did not 
successfully establish objective facts which would have called into question the 
expert's impartiality, and his mere belonging to the institute which had set in 
motion the prosecution was not sufficient to cast doubt on his neutrality. Taking 
any other view, according to the Court, would have had the effect of restricting to 
an intolerable extent the number of experts at the disposal of the court system. 
Furthermore, the mere fact that the expert appointed by the court presented 
evidence supporting the case of the prosecution did not oblige the court to appoint 
other experts at the request of the defence. 
Sometimes it is not so much the position of the expert in the procedure 
which raises a problem as the impact of his or her evidence, deemed to be unfair 
for some external reason. In the case of G.B. v. France101, a psychiatric expert102
was handed, while he was being interviewed, documents relating to the 
applicant’s previous criminal activity, including offences of rape and sexual 
assault, and which the public prosecutor's office had placed in the case-file at the 
beginning of the hearing. He was granted a 15-minute adjournment of the hearing 
in which to read these. When the hearing resumed, he completely changed the 
assessment of the situation that he had made in his written report, which he had 
initially confirmed orally. The defence then requested a second expert report, 
                                                
99   ECHR, case of Bönisch v. Austria of 6 May 1985. 
100   ECHR, case of Brandstetter v. Austria of 28 August 1991. 
101   ECHR, case of G.B. v. France of 2 October 2001. 
102   In this instance we move beyond the field of reports by experts in hard sciences, but this 
particular case seems to provide a relevant illustration of the need for transparency when expert 
reports are drawn up. 
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 which was refused, and the applicant was ultimately sentenced to 18 years' 
imprisonment. He complained that he had not received a fair trial, particularly 
because his request for a second expert opinion had been rejected. The Court 
pointed out that a court's refusal to appoint a second expert when the first expert's 
conclusions were unfavourable to the defendant did not, per se, constitute a 
violation of the Convention103. However, the Court also took the view that, in that 
case, the expert had not just expressed a different opinion during the hearing from 
the one which appeared in his written report, but had performed a complete volte-
face during one and the same hearing. Such an abrupt change of opinion was very 
likely to have made an impression on the members of the jury and therefore to 
have influenced the verdict. A second expert report should therefore have been 
ordered. 
These few ECHR judgments show that there are some cases, 
notwithstanding the supposedly neutral position of the expert in the inquisitorial 
system, in which this neutrality is no longer ensured and the way in which the 
results of the expert examination are presented can no longer be regarded as fair. 
In such cases, the remedy advocated by the Court is to require courts to appoint a 
second expert who would act as a kind of "defence expert" in order to 
counterbalance the effects of the first expert report104. 
It is nevertheless our opinion that this should in fact be a last resort, for 
this solution brings with it its own problems, as we shall see later. In particular, it 
does not solve the main problem, that of knowing how the courts will assess two 
expert reports setting out differing theories. We therefore suggest that thought be 
given to an earlier stage of the procedure, the time at which expert reports are 
written, whatever the position of the expert in the procedure. We call for 
maximum exchange of information between experts and parties, from the moment 
that experts are appointed, for a surprise effect can only be detrimental to a 
balanced and considered assessment of scientific evidence. For it is indeed expert 
reports or statements that need to be balanced and to reflect the respective 
positions of the different parties. 
4.3. Participation by the defence in the production of expert reports 
In order to be intellectually complete and to serve the cause of justice as 
effectively as possible, the work of scientific experts must always comprise an 
                                                 
103   ECHR, case of Brandstetter v. Austria of 28 August 1991, § 46. 
104   The influence of the Bönisch and Brandstetter cases on the decisions taken by domestic courts 
is shown by an example from the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad, 24 April 1992, 
NJ 1992, 644) recognising the right to a second expert opinion if certain formal conditions are met 
(Jakobs & Sprangers, 2000, p 379). 
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evaluation of their technical findings in the light of two opposing hypotheses: the 
facts as stated by the prosecution and the explanations put forward by the defence. 
This makes it crucial for experts to be told as soon as possible the position taken 
by the defendant in respect of the acts of which he or she is accused, and to be 
advised of any new evidence which might influence their assessment of the two 
conflicting hypotheses. This is why criminal procedure should allow sufficient 
scope for the parties (and more specifically the defence) to intervene at an early 
stage of the investigations and throughout the process. 
In its judgment in the case of Mantovanelli v. France105, the Court took 
the view that the principle of adversarial proceedings had been violated in a case 
in which one of the parties had not been informed of the date on which the expert 
would interview witnesses and examine certain documents. It had not been given 
an opportunity to attend to put questions to the said witnesses and request 
additional investigations. It had not therefore been able to participate in the 
production of the report, a report which, once it had been drawn up, was likely to 
influence the court significantly, because of the complexity of the questions raised 
and the significant linkage between the question put to the expert and the one 
which the court was to decide. 
The Court nevertheless pointed out that the principle of adversarial 
proceedings could not give rise to a general right to be present during the expert’s 
activities, as the principle should be applied to the proceedings before the 
"tribunal" in the broad sense. One member of the Court, furthermore, in a 
dissenting opinion, stated that the principle of adversarial proceedings had to be 
respected in the proceedings "as a whole"106, so it was sufficient for a party to 
have the opportunity to challenge the expert report in court when the evidence 
was assessed. 
We agree with the two arguments adduced by the Court. It is difficult to 
imagine, particularly where reports by technical experts are concerned, the parties 
and their defence counsel, possibly accompanied by private advisers, 
"supervising" the expert’s activities and monitoring the way in which he or she 
carries them out107. This would prevent the expert from taking an impartial 
approach to his or her work. It is, however, vital for the defence to participate, by 
putting questions to the expert prior to the report process and by making 
observations after the report has been delivered or after the expert has been 
interviewed at the hearing. This is the only way of guaranteeing that the expert 
will work in a balanced way and examine all the relevant hypotheses. 
                                                
105   ECHR, case of Mantovanelli v. France of 17 February 1997, § 33 and 34. 
106   In other words the proceedings must be regarded as a single entity, and not in terms of their 
separate phases. 
107   Criminal procedure in Italy provides for scientific advisers to the parties to be present during 
the reporting expert's activities (Art 230/2 CPP/Italy). 
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 4.4. Definition of an expert report 
Introduction of a broad right of participation for the defence in the production of 
expert reports can serve equality of arms only in so far as national legislation 
provides an appropriate definition of the expert report. It would in fact be 
conceivable for the defence in some cases to be denied some of its rights, as the 
law would define certain kinds of tests as routine operations automatically 
entrusted to certain laboratories and thereby to some extent falling outside the 
regulations on expert reports108. 
4.5. Potential risks in terms of equality of arms 
In both accusatorial and inquisitorial systems, the defendant is placed in a position 
of disadvantage as compared to the prosecution, so equality of arms may well be 
infringed. This occurs for the following reasons inter alia109: 
 
– Stage at which the defence intervenes 
The second or defence expert becomes involved at a later stage than the 
official/prosecution expert, being appointed either in response to the first 
expert report or by defence counsel, in which case a suspect has already 
been arrested. So, during the critical phase in which samples are taken, 
who ensures that the crime scene is examined in a neutral and 
comprehensive manner? How can a second or defence expert carry out the 
same tests as the official/prosecution expert if the latter has (several weeks 
or months previously) used destructive methods leaving no further scope 
whatsoever for analysis? 
The shortcomings of the investigation at this stage are very 
difficult (or may even be impossible) to make good, inevitably placing the 
defence at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the prosecution. Consequently, in 
many cases, the second or defence expert will not examine samples in 
their original form, but those pre-selected and prepared by the 
official/prosecution experts110, and his or her role will usually be confined 
                                                 
108  See, for instance, Switzerland's new criminal procedure, which excludes from the ordinary 
arrangements for expert reports a range of laboratory tests deemed to be reliable enough not to 
have to be commissioned in an adversarial context (cf Art 184 (3), 2nd sentence, CPP; see Vuille 
(2010). 
109   On these issues, see Roberts (1994, p 477) and Spencer (1992, p 221ss). 
110   Roberts (1994, p 491) 
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to an examination after the event of the work done by the 
official/prosecution expert111. 
– Shortage of experts  
In any given field, and in any given court, it is frequently the case that few 
experts sufficiently independent in professional terms and capable of 
giving a reliable and useful opinion are available. The situation in this 
respect is similar in countries of both the inquisitorial and the accusatorial 
traditions. A court may therefore have difficulty finding an appropriate 
expert112, in the same way as defence counsel may have difficulty locating 
a skilled expert working in equivalent conditions to those of prosecution 
experts113. Assuming that European harmonisation occurs, it would be an 
advantage to pool experts together in their specialist fields. 
– Lack of scientific knowledge and resources on the part of the defence  
It is the specific task of those who write expert reports for the courts to 
give those courts knowledge that they need but do not possess; a lack of 
knowledge thus clearly exists. In our opinion, however, the problem runs 
deeper than this: firstly, lawyers and judges are unaware of the underlying 
scientific implications of an expert report, which they consider to be in 
principle accurate114, making it awkward for the defence to challenge it in 
any way and extremely unlikely that such a challenge would be successful. 
And secondly, even if they wished to make a critical assessment of 
an expert report, their scientific knowledge is so incomplete that they 
would be incapable of identifying the evidence which might give rise to a 
problem. It will frequently be up to the defence to demonstrate why the 
expert report needs to be called into question and, should this be the case, 
why a second report is necessary, which is a very difficult task if the 
lawyer has no scientific training115. The defence can, of course, obtain the 
                                                
111   Spencer (2002a, p 633); Alldridge (1999). In an inquisitorial system, the fact that it can only 
point to alleged shortcomings in the official expert report may have the effect of discrediting the 
defence (as it is criticising a person selected by the court). 
112 A problem which was also noted in the Eggertsdottir case (ECHR, case of Sara Lind 
Eggertsdottir v. Iceland of 5 July 2007). 
113   The court, or the prosecution, effectively holds a long and varied address list, as well as 
enjoying well tried and tested working relations with skilled experts working for accredited 
bodies. The second or defence expert, in contrast, will have to be sought outside these well-known 
communities and will not have the same level of prestige, and the court, or defence counsel, will 
not enjoy the same relationship of trust with him or her as with an expert with whom they have 
been working for a long time. 
114   For the reasons already mentioned: trust in science in general, and in the appointed expert in 
particular. 
115   In this context, see Murphy (forthcoming, pp 24-25). 
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 assistance of a private adviser for this purpose, but has to pay for this if it 
does so (at least on a provisional basis, pending the decision on the case). 
The second generation of scientific evidence (here we are using 
Murphy’s suggested terminology116) raises even more problems in terms 
of the defence's access to the facilities needed in order to refute effectively 
the official/prosecution expert's statements. In particular, it calls for highly 
complicated and very costly analytical instruments117, its use involves 
databases managed by governments118, and its interpretation is sometimes 
done with the assistance of databases constructed in a way which is 
difficult for the defence to ascertain119. 
In our opinion, accusatorial and inquisitorial systems alike do not 
lend themselves to sound management of scientific evidence. The 
accusatorial system, by giving the parties prime responsibility for finding 
evidence, presents the risk of penalising the defendants who are already at 
the greatest disadvantage. Furthermore, it entrusts to the judge or jurors 
the task of assessing scientific evidence in the worst conditions 
imaginable, ie in a spirit of "contradiction for contradiction's sake", and it 
seems to us that these persons have little capacity to determine the 
probative value to be given to such evidence on the sole basis of the 
scientific merits of the evidence, irrespective of the personality and 
behaviour of the experts and lawyers during the hearing. As for the 
inquisitorial system, it is based first and foremost on the court's trust in an 
expert assumed to be both neutral and competent. Hardly ever is the 
                                                 
116   Murphy (forthcoming, pp 4-6) distinguishes between first and second generation scientific 
evidence, the latter having added value because (1) it is found in the context of a wide range of 
offences; (2) it is very frequently detected by the persons responsible for finding evidence at a 
crime scene; (3) developments in this field have often coincided with the introduction of databases 
offering a significant investigative capacity (easy identification of suspects). In addition, second 
generation scientific evidence is distinguished from that of the first generation by two facts: (4) it 
is based on complex techniques, and (5) it raises hitherto (almost) unknown ethical issues and 
issues relating to privacy. 
117   Which brings us back to the question of the number of experts available in any given area, and 
also to that of access to accredited laboratories (which sometimes refuse to carry out tests other 
than on the instructions of a judicial authority, and cannot therefore be instructed by a lawyer to 
produce a private expert report; a lawyer wishing to obtain such a report will thus have to use non-
accredited laboratories or persons, and this will in principle have a detrimental effect on the 
court’s assessment). 
118  Databases on which the DNA and/or fingerprints of persons convicted or under suspicion and 
evidence found at crime scenes are stored. 
119  In the DNA field, for instance, the probability of an association to a given DNA profile (and 
consequently the degree to which it may be incriminating) is calculated using databases which 
record the counts of occurrence of certain genetic characteristics in a given population. These 
databases may not be public, meaning that the defence's experts may have no access to them, and 
would not know how they have been created. 
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expert's work in fact called into question, and when it is, the evidence is 
not assessed on its scientific merits, but on the basis of exogenous factors. 
The assessment of evidence can therefore be described as similar, and 
unsatisfactory, in both systems, for it is based on elements extraneous to 
the scientific method itself. 
5. Admissibility of scientific evidence 
5.1. Introduction 
Contemporary European legal systems are familiar with the principle of freedom 
of evidence, meaning that a court may consider any type of evidence to establish 
the facts (there is no exhaustive list of admissible types of evidence120 and in 
general there is no mandatory evidence whose absence would prevent 
conviction121). Yet there are two kinds of exception to this rule122: 
A first category of evidence cannot be admitted because, despite its 
(hypothetical) reliability, considerations extraneous to the quest for truth 
dictate that it be left out of account. Thus certain legal systems, both accusatorial 
and inquisitorial, preclude consideration of a number of classes of evidence when 
adduced contrary to the statutory provisions123, for example in breach of the 
prohibition of torture, by means limiting the free will of the person subjected to 
them (hypnosis, narco-analysis etc) or again in breach of the procedural rules 
                                                
120   This is the case with Swiss law. Some legal systems, however, exhaustively list the admissible 
types of evidence (for example, Netherlands law; see Meintjes-van der Walt, 2001, p. 148). 
Sometimes it is not the evidence but its very object that is ruled out. For example, Article 220 (2) 
CPP/Italy prohibits establishing the defendant’s “tendency to break the law” by taking expert 
evidence. 
121   By way of an exception, the law compels the court to avail itself of certain kinds of evidence. 
In Swiss law, it must for example appoint a psychiatric expert before ordering an internment 
measure, a medical expert to carry out an autopsy, etc. In German law, the court cannot make a 
finding of guilt before it has assessed one of the 5 types of evidence prescribed in the 
Strafprozessordnung (Juy-Birmann, 2002, p. 325). 
122  The European Court of Human Rights holds that admissibility of evidence is a matter for 
regulation under national law (ECHR, case of Schenk v. Switzerland of 12 July 1988, § 46), and 
rules only as to whether the proceedings, “considered as a whole, including the way in which 
evidence was taken, were fair” (EurCourtHR, case of Kostovski v. Netherlands of 20 November 
1989, § 39.). That is, unless the gathering of evidence has been done in a way that infringes the 
Convention, for example under torture, in which case the evidence must be deemed utterly 
unusable. 
123   Whereas certain types of evidence will invariably be dismissed (particularly where contrary to 
a provision of the ECHR, such as admissions extracted under torture), there will often be a 
weighing of interests between the seriousness of the offence prosecuted and the importance of the 
procedural rules infringed in order to obtain the evidence, taking into account the effect that the 
breach of procedural norms may have had on the reliability of the evidence in question. 
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 governing the manner of obtaining certain evidence (searches or telephone 
tapping without a valid warrant, questioning of a witness not having been 
informed of his or her rights, taking a biological sample outside the legal 
framework, etc). This stems from a concern to ensure that the state complies with 
the same rules of conduct as it imposes on its citizens in the prosecution of 
offences. 
A second category of evidence cannot be admitted because it would be 
detrimental to the discovery of the truth. It is excluded because it poses too 
great a risk of biasing the decision-maker (judge or jury) in relation to what it 
really contributes to the proceedings. Continental legal systems are traditionally 
less responsive to this argument than the British and American ones, and hold that 
the judge trying a case is capable of assigning the due probative force to all 
evidence adduced, without needing to make an initial selection124. Thus they 
know no exclusionary rules based on this second argument125, whereas the 
Common Law accepts that a court may decide at its own discretion that a piece of 
evidence will be dismissed if, for example, its probative value is exceeded by the 
risk of confusion that it poses126. 
5.2. Scientific admissibility 
The scientific admissibility of evidence, while subject to fairly precise rules in 
United States law, as will be shown, is seldom addressed in European legal 
writings, and continental legal systems127 seem very uncommunicative on the 
subject128. The question of scientific reliability is seen as intrinsically linked with 
the assessment of the actual evidence, that is with the determination of its 
probative value: if its scientific reliability can be challenged, its probative value 
                                                 
124   Some consider that this difference of approach is linked entirely with the presence or absence 
of a jury, an opinion qualified by others (Damaška, 1973, p. 514). 
125   A continental judge may nevertheless refuse to adduce certain evidence (examining a witness, 
appointing an expert, etc.) despite its cogency, where he holds that such evidence will not alter the 
opinion which he has already formed of the case. On these issues, see Damaška (1973). 
126   “(…) if its probative value is deemed to be substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair 
prejudice or confusion of the issues.” (Durston, 2008, p. 34). 
127   It will be seen that English law regarding this question is in the midst of change and seems to 
be moving towards “Americanisation” of the system. 
128   The need to distinguish between procedural and scientific admissibility is furthermore not 
unanimously accepted, some legal commentators being of the opinion that scientific evidence 
must be admitted once it is obtained legally (ie is admissible in a procedural sense) and relevant, 
and any question of its scientific reliability must be part of the assessment of the evidence. Others 
take the opposite view that, given the complexity of the issues raised, this assessment should be 
made separately against clear criteria. On this point, see Hayajneh & Al-Rawashdeh (2010) and 
the quoted authors. 
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will be deemed slight, and vice versa129. The evidence is thus admitted at the 
outset, it then being up to the trial court when assigning the evidence its due 
probative value to take account of any errors that may have rendered it unreliable. 
US law on the other hand clearly distinguishes between these two phases: 
admitting expert evidence does not presuppose ruling on its probative value 
(hence on the comparative worth of two or more expert testimonies), but purely 
on its ability to assist in the task of deciding the case130. 
The scientific admissibility of scientific evidence may be determined in 
various ways: for example, focusing solely on the person of the expert and 
admitting all relevant evidence coming from an accredited expert or, at the other 
extreme, only raising questions about the intrinsic merits of the evidence itself 
without regard for the person who has analysed or interpreted it131. 
Black, Ayala & Saffran-Brinks (1994, p. 731) enumerate what they term 
“surrogates for understanding science”, ie criteria used by lawyers to assess 
scientific evidence which are unsatisfactory because they are not based on an 
understanding of the evidence adduced but on heuristics of reasoning132. Here is a 
non-exhaustive list of them together with the reasons why they are not enough: 
• the “general acceptance” of the Frye decision: the definition of what 
should be accepted, in which scientific field, and to what degree of 
acceptance, makes it difficult to apply this criterion133; 
• peer review: this criterion does not indicate whether a technique accepted 
in scientific literature has been used properly in a given case; 
• ascertaining the error rates of a test: that can prove misleading if not all its 
complexities are understood134; 
                                                
129   Redmayne (2001, p. 118) notes that the concepts of reliability, relevance and probative value 
are often confused. He also notes that the concept of reliability is at present completely 
underdeveloped in English law, and proposes a conceptualisation based on the concept of 
likelihood ratio or LR. 
130   Beecher-Monas (2007, p. 7). 
131   Alldridge (1999, p. 7). 
132   The heuristics of reasoning are mental short-cuts for taking decisions by activating a 
minimum of mental resources. An example documented in criminological literature is precisely 
the evaluation of an expert based on extraneous criteria rather than on the substance of what he 
says; see Ivkovic & Hans (2003), while Honess & Charman (2002) are more guarded. The 
heuristics of reasoning usually make it possible to take decisions that are good enough for the task 
at hand (hence their usefulness in terms of moving forward), but also sometimes generate error (as 
illustrated by the significant body of literature on the pitfalls of intuition in the evaluation of 
statistics). 
133   See para. 5.3 and the criticisms levelled at the Frye standard. 
134   For example, the positive result of an AIDS test with a false negative rate of 2.3% and false 
positives of 7.4% is deemed symptomatic of the disease in only 5% of cases (because of a low 
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 • focusing on the expert’s qualifications rather than on the substance of 
what he says: the expert’s qualifications are a necessary but insufficient 
condition for a grasp of scientific evidence. Acceptance of the opposite 
would have the outcome of giving any qualified expert discretion as to 
what is legally relevant135. Furthermore, even a competent expert may 
have erred in the specific case; 
• some assessment criteria focus on the instruments used or on the use made 
of them, for instance: Is the instrument new? Is it properly maintained? 
Quite obviously that cannot suffice, otherwise, taking the argument to 
extremes, a fortune-teller’s opinion would be admitted on the pretext that 
she has a fresh pack of cards; 
• finally, other plainly inadequate “surrogates” focus on the impact of an 
expert’s opinion on the decision-maker, more specifically the jury, and 
especially the clarity with which the expert is able to present his opinion. 
 
These elements, though, do not allow the scientific quality of evidence to be 
validly assessed. Black, Ayala & Saffran-Brinks (1994, p. 782 ff.) thus suggest 
the following criteria to help lawyers understand the scientific data before them: 
• Explanatory power: a reliable science is descriptive and predictive; it 
offers a plausible explication for a mechanism; 
• Falsifiability: a scientific hypothesis must be formulated in such a way 
that it can be empirically tested; 
• Coherence: a reliable scientific hypothesis is coherent, does not contradict 
itself, and is not tautological; 
• Diversity of the experiments conducted: the soundness of a hypothesis is 
the greater the more and more varied trials it has withstood; 
• Consistency with established scientific theories: scientific knowledge is 
cumulative, that is a new theory is often founded on knowledge already 
acquired; a theory that drastically breaks with existing science should thus 
be viewed with scepticism; 
• Use by the scientific community: the fact that a scientific theory is taken 
up and used by other members of the scientific community is a strong 
indication of its reliability; 
• Precision: very vague generalisations are tenuous and very hard to put 
through varied experimentation to test their reliability; 
                                                                                                                                     
basal frequency, only one out of 250 persons in the population is theoretically infected) (Koehler 
& Saks, 1991).  
135   Faigman (1989, p. 1012); Huber (1991b, p. 199). 
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• Validation a posteriori: an a posteriori interpretation of pre-existing data 
to make them conform to a new hypothesis cannot constitute reliable 
scientific knowledge; 
• Peer review and publication: though insufficient per se, these are two 
important indices of the thoroughness of the work performed.  
As will be seen in the following paragraphs, current practice is rather remote from 
these prescriptions, as some courts apply criteria whose relevance is disputable 
(and energetically disputed!), while other legal systems adopt virtually a complete 
laissez-faire attitude and defer to the common sense of their magistrates. 
5.3.  Comparative law 
a) The United States system 
The United States136 have seen several admissibility criteria in succession over the 
past century, which may be summarised as follows137: 
In 1923 in the case of Frye v. United States138, a defendant charged with 
murder set out to prove his innocence with the help of a forerunner of the lie 
detector. The evidence was deemed inadmissible on the ground that it sprang 
from a technique that was not generally accepted in the relevant scientific 
community139. This is what we call the criterion of “general acceptance”.  
Several decades later, this criterion was nevertheless deemed 
unsatisfactory for several reasons:  
• Some considered it too conservative because it was necessary to wait 
for a method to become widespread in order for it to be used in a 
judicial context; 
                                                
136   It should be observed that these criteria are applied variously over US territory because, while 
the federal courts are subject to the case-law established by the US Supreme Court, the state courts 
remain independent. As a consequence of this, certain states (not the least populous: California, 
Florida and New York) continue to apply Frye. 
137   See in particular Michaelis, Flanders & Wulff (2008, p. 215 ff). 
138   Frye v. United States 293 F 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
139  Note that prior to this judgment, the expert was merely asked about the nature of his 
qualifications and, if the subject-matter of his work went beyond the average knowledge of the 
jurors, he was accepted. Not to be content with the qualifications of a single expert, and to consult 
the scientific community, was thus the great advance ushered in by Frye (Huber, 1991b, p. 199). 
At present an occasional tendency to revert to this old criterion is noted, merely verifying the 
accreditation of an expert without examining the substance of his statements. 
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 • to others, it was on the contrary too permissive because any technique 
might be made acceptable by defining the “scientific community” 
somewhat restrictively140; 
• it did not necessarily emphasise the real crux of the problem; for 
example, an analytical technique could be generally accepted, and so 
the cogency of the inferences made from the results did not come 
under scrutiny (Giannelli, 1980);  
• the criterion of knowing what constituted “general acceptance” was 
variously applied by the courts. 
 
Frye was based on the idea that the court should trust the judgment of the 
scientific community to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence. This 
conception of the relationship between expert and judge thus (implicitly) 
presupposed that the scientific community be regarded as a neutral group aspiring 
only to discern the truth. A major drawback of this approach was that the very 
persons with an interest in having a method declared admissible were asked for 
their opinion on it141. 
The entry into force of Federal Rule of Evidence 702142 in 1975 sounded 
the knell of the Frye criterion143. Indeed, it required that expert testimony be 
relevant (as well as reliable) in order to be admissible, thereby making the Frye 
criterion insufficient144. So there was now a dual requirement of legal relevance to 
the instant case and scientific reliability of the method145. 
In 1993 in the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.146, 
two children born with disabilities claimed damages from the manufacturer of the 
drug Bendectin, submitting that their mother’s taking the drug during pregnancy 
(to combat morning sickness) had caused their disability. To determine the 
                                                 
140   On this question, see in particular Cole (2008). 
141   Faigman (1999, p. 62). 
142 “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the 
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and 
methods reliably to the facts of the case.” 
143   Whether FRE 702 actually signified that Frye should fall was debated for many years. The 
Daubert decision clarified the position by answering this in the affirmative. 
144   Sanders, Diamond & Vidmar (2002).  
145   The phases of the moon would, for example, constitute scientifically valid and legally relevant 
information in the field of astronomy but not of astrology (see Black et al., 1994, p. 747 quoting 
the example given by judge Blackmun in the Daubert decision). 
146   Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). 
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reliability of the expert testimony brought, the Supreme Court referred to the 
concept of scientific147 validity148, and proposed five criteria for its ascertainment: 
• the method’s falsifiability149; 
• peer review and publication150; 
• the method’s margins of error (known or presumed); 
• the standards governing application; 
• general acceptance in the relevant scientific community151; 
While acknowledging that in general the jury alone should determine the 
probative value of a piece of evidence, the Supreme Court pointed out that only 
valid scientific evidence should be put to the jury, and that the judge must 
therefore evaluate the expert’s testimony before its presentation to the jury, 
thereby vesting the judge with a mandatory role of gatekeeper152. By this 
gatekeeping procedure it is implicitly acknowledged that the accusatorial system 
is not a sufficient barrier to admission of unreliable evidence153. The Daubert
factors mentioned above are assessed at the court’s absolute discretion (in the 
light of supporting documents supplied by the parties and examination of their 
experts). In no circumstances is it expected that the technical element need meet 
the five criteria in order to be admitted154. 
A sixth criterion was added with the General Electric Co. v. Joiner
decision (1997)155, viz: 
• Relevance to the case before the court, which entails examining the 
validity of the inferences made between the analyses and their practical 
application to the stated problem156. 
                                                
147   In the case of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court, while excluding non-
scientific knowledge from the ambit of Daubert, pointed out that intellectual rigour in reasoning 
ought to apply not only to scientific knowledge in the true sense but to any type of knowledge 
drawn from experience or practice. 
148   An indiscriminate use of the terms “validity” and “reliability” is noted in the literature. Valid
means that the technique yields accurate results (close to the true value established with reference 
to standards). To be called reliable, the technique is expected to afford an adequate degree of 
precision (of reproducibility) and correctness. In forensics, reliability is sought first and foremost. 
149   Can the method be tested? Has it actually been tested? 
150   Which does not constitute a final test of reliability, but at least increases the likelihood that 
gross methodological errors will be discerned. 
151   Frye is thus retained, but solely as one of the validity criteria. 
152   Berger (2000, p. 11). 
153   DeCoux, (2007, p. 146). 
154   Assessments of fingerprint evidence along the lines of Daubert speak volumes here (Kaye, 
2003).  
155   General Electric Co. v. Joiner 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
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 Indeed, contrary to the idea that had been suggested in Daubert of the judge’s 
examination needing to concern only the methodology employed and not the 
conclusions drawn from it, the Supreme Court held in Joiner that the conclusions 
and the method were always linked in some way, but that, while accepting the 
reliability of the analysis carried out, the judge must remain free to dismiss the 
inferences made from it by an expert when they went beyond what was 
reasonable. 
Lastly, as the third pillar of the “Daubert trilogy”, the decision in the case 
of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999)157 gave the Supreme Court occasion to 
specify the scope of this entire set of rules and thereby broadened the obligation 
imposed on courts to determine the reliability and the relevance of expert opinions 
were not strictly scientific, but based on observation and long experience158. Thus 
it was no longer a question of applying the Daubert criteria rigidly and 
establishing a taxonomy of reliable and unreliable scientific methods, but much 
more of encouraging a pragmatic approach based on the instant case before all 
else. For example, a judge should not enquire whether forensic document 
examination constitutes, in abstracto, an established science, but should know 
whether a given expert in a given case, working in a given way from given data, 
can produce reliable information capable of helping establish the facts159. The 
situation in Canada is observed to be very similar160. 
Contrary to the spirit of Frye, the Daubert, Joiner and Kumho trilogy of 
decisions implicitly emphasises the scepticism which the judge must maintain vis-
à-vis the expert, who is thus no longer considered a member of an authoritative 
elite but a social agent comparable to any other, possibly subject to pressure of a 
political and economic kind that may impair his discernment. In the Daubert 
decision, judge Kozinski furthermore added a criterion to the first five, namely the 
question whether the scientific knowledge contributed by the expert had been 
developed in an independent context of research or rather in one linked with the 
                                                                                                                                     
156    This was clarified in the case of General Electric Co. v. Joiner, in which the Supreme Court 
held that questions of method and results could not be totally divorced, because the question of 
relevance presupposed enquiring to what extent the findings were applicable to the instant case. 
157   Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
158   “skill or experience-based observation”. 
159   Berger (2000, pp. 31-32). 
160  Matters of admissibility of technical evidence are settled in Canada by the R. v Mohan 
judgment [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9. This provides for assessment of (1) the relevance of the technical 
element in the context of the case being tried, (2) the court’s need of assistance, (3) absence of an 
exclusion criterion (particularly in the light of the Canadian Charter) and (4) the expert’s 
qualification. In the event that the testimony brings new techniques into play, the judgment calls 
for an assessment of the reliability of the technique according to the 5 criteria proposed in the 
Daubert decision. This precedent was confirmed in R. v. J.J. [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600. 
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case being tried, which might raise doubts about the objectiveness of those 
involved161. 
Daubert is nonetheless criticised firstly because the criteria proposed are 
merely surrogates for understanding; secondly because expert opinions are also 
made up of complex reasoning processes that do not readily fit into such narrow 
confines162; thirdly because of the active role which it gives the judge, who must 
enjoy a minimum of scientific competence163, and lastly because the freedom 
allowed to the judge generates legal uncertainty, since in a given territory judicial 
rulings may be divergent. In an opinion dissenting from the Daubert decision, 
Judge Rehnquist furthermore condemned this rule requiring each judge to become 
an “amateur scientist”164. Following its publication, the NRC report (2009) is 
expected to have an impact on future decisions, and even court practice, regarding 
admissibility (Edwards, 2010). 
b) The United Kingdom 
Expert scientific evidence is generally deemed admissible in English law if it 
fulfils four conditions: 
1) it concerns a subject exceeding the ordinary knowledge and experience of 
whoever must decide the case; 
2) it concerns a subject in a field of knowledge which is sufficiently well 
organised and recognised to be considered a reliable source of knowledge, 
a field of which the expert in question has special knowledge that could 
assist the court in its task; 
                                                
161   This requirement was subsequently challenged on the ground that forensic sciences had no 
applications outside the judicial context and thus were never really dissociated from an aim of 
criminal prosecution (Beecher-Monas, 2007, p. 10). This contention may nevertheless be 
qualified: a method of identification developed in a context of fundamental research should 
logically have greater credence than a test improvised to conform to the case in point. 
162   Black, Ayala, Saffran-Brinks (1994, pp. 732-733). 
163  An American study shows that while 91% of the judges questioned (out of a total of 400 
magistrates distributed throughout the territory and belonging to state courts of 1st instance) 
considered it quite within their jurisdiction to rule on the admissibility of a piece of evidence and 
that Daubert gave them useful guidelines for this, the concepts of falsifiability and error rates were 
properly understood by only 6% and 4% respectively (as against 90% correct answers concerning 
the two other criteria of peer review and general acceptance). See Gatowski et al. (2001). 
Admittedly, however, these results do not tell us about the practical application of these concepts 
in actual cases. 
164   Daubert, 509 U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
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 3) the expert must have acquired through study or experience sufficient 
knowledge to render his opinion useful to the court165; 
4) the expert must be impartial. 
 
Concerning the second criterion, the only one of interest in the context of this 
presentation, English Common Law at present has no well defined rules (along 
Daubert lines) for determining a priori the scientific admissibility of evidence166: 
the judge decides at his own discretion whether the evidence affords adequate 
guarantees of scientific reliability and is relevant167. If so, it will rest with the jury 
to make a determination on the reliability of the method in concreto. Some writers 
criticise this state of affairs on the ground that it effectively saddles the defence 
with the burden of proving the unreliability of the scientific evidence adduced by 
the prosecution168. 
In practice, if the expert is accredited or has the necessary qualifications 
and the subject on which he offers to testify is relevant to the case before the 
court, his testimony is generally admitted169. In sum, the Common Law rejects 
expert evidence based on charlatanism (astrology for example), accepts “well-
established” methods, and lays down the dual requirement of relevance and 
reliability for the other types of expert submissions (ie most of them)170. On the 
latter point, the Law Commission acknowledges that there is no guideline to help 
judges settle the question of admissibility, and that in practice a “laissez-faire” 
attitude prevails, with only “patently unreliable” methods being excluded 171. The 
House of Commons Science & Technology Committee172 considered this situation 
unsatisfactory and advocated laying down objective, clearly defined criteria to 
determine the reliability of a technique, which it thought should be modelled on 
the criteria evolved by the US Supreme Court in the Daubert decision. 
                                                 
165   These first three criteria are criteria laid down by the Supreme Court of South Australia in 
judgment R. v. Bonython (1984, 38 SASR 45, 46,47). Some have likened the 2nd stated condition 
to the US Frye standard. The Law Commission, however, diverges from this position (Law 
Commission, p. 19-21). In Redmayne’s opinion (2001, p. 95), the 3rd criterion stated here is, in 
English law , the closest approach to a stipulation that expert evidence be reliable. 
166   Such a “gatekeeper” role was moreover denied to the judge by the Court of Appeal in 
decision R. v. Luttrell [2004] EWCA Crim 1344 (The Law Commission, 2009, p. 18). 
167   These two elements are the necessary criteria for allowing an expert opinion on a given 
subject (R. v. Dallagher [2002] EWCA Crim 1903 para 29; R. v. Luttrell [2004] EWCA Crim 
1344 para 37). The evidence is deemed relevant if it can be of any help in determining the case (R. 
v. Turner [1975] QB 834).  
168   Redmayne (1997, p. 1046) and references given. 
169   Alldridge (1999, pp. 154-155)  
170   Law Commission (2009, pp. 21-22). 
171  Some recent cases discussed in the case literature, such as Dallagher and Clark, are not 
unconnected with this reform movement. 
172   House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (2005, pp. 75-77). 
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The recent work of the Law Commission, still under discussion, sought to 
identify the best way of determining the reliability of a scientific technique and 
also the reliability of the conclusions drawn by the expert in a specific case. At the 
conclusion of its study, it proposed four possible solutions173, giving its 
preference to a criterion of admissibility requiring the judge himself to decide on 
the reliability of the evidence, which thus corresponds to the solution 
recommended in the Daubert decision. Recognising the limitations of this 
approach, the Law Commission recommends that this model of “gatekeeping” by 
judges be adopted nonetheless, chiefly because it appears more realistic to assign 
this function of evaluating scientific reliability to judges than to leave it in the 
hands of the jurors. 
It further proposes that the criteria for determining the admissibility of 
scientific evidence be as follows174: 
• The expert’s opinion is admissible only if sufficiently reliable; 
• The party wishing to submit an expert’s opinion bears the burden of 
proving its reliability; 
• The evidence is sufficiently reliable if175: 
(a) based on sound principles, techniques and assumptions; 
(b) these principles, theories and assumptions have been properly applied 
to the case; and 
(c) the evidence follows from those principles, theories and assumptions 
as applied to the facts of the case. 
In order to establish these various criteria, the Law Commission proposes that the 
following questions be taken into account176: 
                                                
173  Discretionary decision of the judge with (1) or without guidelines (2), generally accepted 
criterion in the scientific community (3), criterion of scientific reliability based on the judge’s 
assessment (4). 
174   Law Commission (2009, p. 50). 
175   The original text is as follows (The Law Commission, 2009, p. 50): 
(a) the evidence is predicated on sound principles, techniques and assumptions; 
(b) those principles, techniques and assumptions have been properly applied to the facts of the 
case ; and 
(c) the evidence is supported by those principles, techniques and assumptions as applied to the 
facts of the case. 
176   The original text is as follows (The Law Commission, 2009, p. 53 ss.): 
“In determining whether scientific (or purportedly scientific) expert evidence is sufficiently 
reliable to be admitted, the court shall consider the following factors and any other factors 
considered to be relevant: 
(a) whether the principles, techniques and assumptions relied on have been properly tested, and, 
if so, the extent to which the results of those tests demonstrate that they are sound; 
(b) the margin of error associated with the application of, and conclusions drawn from, the 
principles, techniques and assumptions; 
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 • has the method used been tested and, if so, to what extent do the 
results substantiate that the method is reliable? 
• what are the method’s error rates? 
• is there a body of scientific literature relating to the method in 
question? 
• has the method been subjected to peer review; to what extent is it 
regarded as reliable? 
• what are the qualifications, experience and standing of the expert in 
the scientific community; has he produced publications on the subject? 
• is there an opposing position in the scientific community; what are the 
qualifications, experience and standing in the scientific community of 
the persons holding these opposite views? 
• are there indications that the expert has acted in breach of his duty of 
impartiality? 
 
It nevertheless adds that implementation of the Daubert criteria in the United 
Kingdom would necessitate the following ancillary measures:  
• a judge might, by way of an exception, in very difficult cases, appoint 
an expert to assist him; the expert’s role would be confined to helping 
the judge determine the reliability of an expert’s opinion but not to 
comment on the actual object of the expert appraisal; 
• adequate training for magistrates called upon to apply these new 
criteria; 
• a system of accreditation for experts, allowing the justice system to 
guard against certain unreliable types of evidence. 
 
The indirect effect expected to be achieved by these measures is to encourage 
prospective experts to adopt high standards in order to facilitate their possible 
formal admission before the courts. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
(c) whether there is a body of specialised literature relating to the field; 
(d) the extent to which the principles, techniques an assumptions have been considered by other 
scientists – for example in peer-reviewed publications – and, if so, the extent to which they are 
regarded as sound in the scientific community; 
(e) the expert witness’s relevant qualifications, experience and publications and his or her 
standing in the scientific community; 
(f) the scientific validity of opposing views (if any) and the relevant qualifications and experience 
and professional standing in the scientific community of the scientists who hold those views; and 
(g) whether there is evidence to suggest that the expert witness has failed to act in accordance 
with his or her overriding duty of impartiality.” 
 The Law Commission proposes analogous criteria for assessing experience-based rather 
than strictly scientific evidence (p. 57). 
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c) Continental legal systems 
Contrary to US law especially, continental legal systems often have nothing to say 
about the scientific criteria to be met by evidence if it is to be deemed reliable and 
thus given a part in the search for truth, or they settle the question so concisely 
that it is hard to imagine how the principle will be applied in a specific case177. 
For instance, Article 244 II of the German Strafprozessordnung simply 
provides that “das Gericht hat zur Erforschung der Wahrheit die 
Beweisaufnahme von Amts wegen auf alle Tatsachen und Beweismittel zu 
erstrecken, die für die Entscheidung von Bedeutung sind”. (In order to discover 
the truth, the court shall take evidence ex officio from every fact and proof that is 
relevant to the judgment). Under the terms of Article 427 (1) of the French Code 
of Criminal Procedure, offences may be determined by any mode of proof “that 
can establish the truth”178. In Swiss law, finally, the scientific admissibility of 
evidence is governed by a principle to say the least abstract: “The criminal justice 
authorities shall employ all lawful types of evidence which, in the current state of 
scientific knowledge and experience, are apt to establish the truth.” (Article 139 
(2) CPP/Switzerland). In practice the situation is regulated unsystematically, 
traditional types of evidence being admitted because they always have been (and, 
so it is believed, because of their long-proven reliability), while calls for expert 
testimony concerning “outlandish” subjects are rejected. In borderline cases the 
judge will appoint the expert and decide as to the probative value of the expert 
testimony according to the intelligibility of the report and in the light of the other 
facts of the case. 
Formally, in countries of the inquisitorial tradition, the question of 
scientific reliability is thus confused with the actual assessment, that is the 
question of how much probative force to assign to the various pieces of evidence 
adduced. There is no test of admissibility as such. That probably has something to 
do with the procedural arrangements in these countries, where professional judges 
and the duty to give reasons for decisions are seen as an adequate safeguard 
against the taking of unreliable and irrelevant evidence179. 
                                                
177   There are, however, a number of exceptions: the Netherlands Court of Cassation (Hoge Raad, 
January 27, 1998, NJ 1998, 404) issues some general rules on assessment of scientific evidence: 
an assessment of the theoretical soundness of the technique, of its reliability in being applied, and 
the expert’s qualifications. In Poland too, the Supreme Court invites judges to consider the degree 
of certainty permitted by the technique and its methodological quality (Girdwoyn & Tomaszewski, 
2010). The method is expected to be recognised not only in specialist circles but also among the 
scientific community in the broad sense. Moreover, the application of the method should be 
circumscribed by recognised operational procedures implemented by an institution recognised by 
judicial bodies. 
178   Stefani, Levasseur & Bouloc (2006, p. 109). 
179   Langbein (1977, p. 69). 
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 It is therefore plain that magistrates are left to their own devices in taking 
these decisions, with the risk of disparate practices developing, of unreliable 
evidence being admitted, or new methods being rejected when they may be 
perfectly capable to serving justice. 
However, this issue has to be seen in relation to the expert’s position in 
proceedings. These systems typified by a “laissez-faire” attitude towards 
admissibility are precisely the ones where the trust placed in the expert by the 
court is greatest, since these systems are also the ones which make the greatest 
use of officially appointed experts. When these various elements are combined, 
one finds oneself in a system where the position of the defence is extremely 
precarious: the judge has complete confidence in the expert whom it has 
appointed since the expert is presumed impartial and competent, the expert 
testimony need not undergo any formal test of admissibility, it is presumed 
correct because all players in the criminal justice system regard science as 
infallible, and the material and intellectual resources of the defence in this respect 
are limited. To cap it all, and this will be the subject of the next chapter, 
assessment of the strength of scientific expertise is a problematical step and there 
is every reason to believe that at present it is not handled in the best possible way. 
 
5.4. Who should determine the scientific admissibility of evidence? 
 
Is a judge the most competent person to determine the scientific admissibility of 
evidence? 
Although a large body of legal and scientific literature post-dating 
Daubert urged lawyers to acquire training in the assessment of scientific 
evidence, this wish is unrealistic. Contrary to widespread belief, there is no single 
scientific method which if properly understood would enable a lawyer to 
understand all the scientific evidence placed before him. Science is a 
conglomerate of diverse methods that defy reduction to a few criteria calling for 
yes/no answers. Unlike law, science functions by degrees and it is all a question 
of relevance to the legal issues of the specific case. 
A number of factors argue against entrusting judges with the task of 
determining the reliability of scientific evidence180: 
 
• Judges are not in a position to decide whether a given body of knowledge 
constitutes a science (it is a question of epistemology or philosophy of the 
sciences); 
• if it is for judges to settle questions of admissibility, this may cause 
disparity of practice and legal uncertainty (unpredictability of decisions); 
                                                 
180   Alldridge,(1999, p. 156 ff.); Alldridge (1992a). 
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• it may unduly prolong proceedings if a judge must continually address the 
same questions over again, or questions already settled elsewhere; 
• (above all under an accusatorial system) advocates of a new technique 
may have substantial financial interests in its acceptance by the courts and 
commit a great deal of money to that outcome, thereby placing the 
defendant in a rather uncomfortable position. 
We therefore feel that both the “laissez-faire” attitude of inquisitorial systems and 
the method of asking magistrates to assess a list of scientific criteria are both 
unsatisfactory solutions in that they do not guarantee sound use of scientific 
evidence in criminal proceedings.  
6. Assessing evidence, and more specifically scientific evidence 
6.1. Courts' discretion to assess evidence 
The European Convention on Human Rights does not include the principle that 
courts have discretion to assess evidence, but it applies in every European 
country. This means that the courts are not bound by a legal hierarchy of types of 
evidence and that the law does not lay down in advance their evidential value181. 
An absence of evidence does not prevent a conviction182 and equally the existence 
of certain types of evidence does not lead automatically to a guilty verdict183.  
Courts are therefore free to make their own decisions, which means that 
they can base them on any relevant evidence and are not bound by the 
requirement of rationality - in other words the obligation to abide by the rules of 
formal logic and technical and scientific rules184 – and the prohibition of arbitrary 
                                                
181   Certain forms of evidence are considered to be correct until shown to the contrary. This 
applies, for example, to certain reports prepared by sworn officers under French law (Dervieux, 
2002, p. 263). 
182   There are however exceptions to this principle because in certain legal systems some evidence 
must be corroborated.  
183   However, there are certain exceptions: for example in British law if the accused opts to plead 
guilty the court must convict, even if the judge believes otherwise (Spencer, 2002b, p. 196). In 
other systems there are also irrefutable presumptions as a result of which once evidence is adduced 
a certain state of affairs is taken to be established. For example, under Article 2.2 of the Swiss 
road traffic regulations, a certain level of alcohol in the blood as established by a blood test 
requires the Swiss courts to find automatically that the individual concerned is incapable of 
driving a vehicle.  
184   For Swiss law, see Müller (1992), pp. 66 ff ; Verniory (2000), pp. 393-396. For German law, 
see Huber (2008), p. 292.  
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 decisions. They may or may not have to give reasons for their decisions, 
depending on the system.  
Although forensic evidence is theoretically subject to the principle of the 
courts' discretion to assess evidence185 and should therefore be critically assessed, 
the day-to-day practice of the courts may be somewhat different. Given such 
previously mentioned factors as confidence in experts and gaps in judges' 
scientific knowledge, consideration should be given to how much weight such 
evidence really carries in satisfying the court. 
6.2. Assessing scientific evidence  
It goes without saying that all those involved in preparing technical evidence, 
whether as part of the preliminary inquiries, the judicial investigation or the trial 
phase, must operate within strict practice guidelines. There are now clear rules 
governing the analytical part, with almost systematic use of accredited protocols, 
often based on ISO standard 17020. For example, the Council of Europe's 1992 
Recommendation R (92) 1 on DNA testing lays down welcome and strict rules to 
ensure that laboratories carrying out such analyses satisfy certain technical 
requirements. Recent European Union recommendations, such as Council 
Framework Decision 2009/905/JHA of 30 November 2009 on accreditation of 
forensic service providers carrying out laboratory activities, are also concerned 
with DNA profiling and fingerprint data. Other areas of forensic science are 
moving in the same direction in Europe and the ENFSI (European Network of 
Forensic Science Institutes) has made an important contribution to drawing up 
good practices, through its working groups. The ENFSI urges all its members to 
seek accreditation. In 2007 (Malkoc & Neuteboom, 2007), nearly 40% of 
laboratories affiliated to the ENFSI were accredited; the current figure is nearly 
70%. 
While it is important for courts to be reassured that forensic sciences are 
based on good practices and protocols it has to be said that the high standards that 
are applied to analyses do not extend to the way the results are interpreted and 
expressed in expert reports (Willis, 2009). There is no specific standard under ISO 
17025 on the drafting of expert reports or the presentation and communication of 
the results to the judicial authorities. Yet how results are interpreted and 
communicated to the courts is of fundamental importance. Not only must forensic 
scientists have the requisite technical and analytical skills, which is generally the 
                                                 
185  There are sometimes limits to the principle. In Switzerland, for example, the courts are free to 
assess expert evidence as they see fit but must give reasons for their decision if they decide not to 
accept an expert's conclusions. The established case-law is that courts can reject expert evidence if 
it is inconsistent or is based on facts which differ from those established in the pre-trial 
proceedings, or when two experts differ in their opinion. 
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case, but they must also develop the capacity to interpret the relevant data 
(Fereday & Kopp, 2003).  
As several writers have noted, there is no single body of rules on 
interpretation (or terminology) common to all the forensic community. Following 
the Guy Paul Morin case, the Kaufman commission (Kaufman, 1998) looked at 
these issues in great depth. In his study of genetic analysis as part of forensic 
evidence, Verhaegen (1997) was already stressing the need for all laboratories to 
have effective protocols and systems for interpreting results. According to Garrett 
and Neufeld (2009), numerous errors of communication can lead to a poor 
assessment of the significance of technical aspects of a case. Walker & 
Stockdale (1999, pp. 148-149) conclude their own study: "Thus, there remain 
problems, especially about the standards employed in analysis and the soundness 
of the interpretation of results, with the grave danger that the jury will be seduced 
by the purity of the science without fully considering the impurity of its 
applications". 
The NRC (National Research Council, 2009) report also drew attention to 
the dangers of using tendentious, or even fallacious, terminology, to the extent 
that its authors felt the need to make a specific recommendation on the subject. 
Legal systems currently apply the principle that courts have discretion to 
evaluate evidence, sometimes after cross-examination. There is a paradoxical 
element here, since courts acknowledge the limits to their technical knowledge by 
appointing experts, while retaining the right to reject the latter's conclusions if 
they consider this necessary. In technical areas in particular, courts have no other 
option but to rely on an expert, though this may be tested in cross-examination, or 
to choose between two different expert opinions, according to criteria that remain 
obscure. Yet the courts' freedom to form an opinion on the facts implies that they 
will apply the principle of rationality and transparency in their decision-making. 
Simply delegating responsibility to an expert is not compatible with this principle. 
Such delegation currently causes problems because experts do not use a uniform 
terminology in their reports and when they are questioned, and because what they 
say is often partial and only presents the prosecution's case or, at best, is open to 
several interpretations or even a systematic overestimation of the contribution of 
the technical component.  
We see opportunities for recommendations on the drafting of expert 
reports from the specific standpoints of how to assess the value of the 
information, the terminology to be used and how to formulate conclusions. These 
could help to harmonise European practice, irrespective of the judicial system 
concerned186. Interpreting technical evidence is not an easy task for either 
scientists or lawyers, This is because it takes place at the interface of two worlds 
                                                
186   Dr. Sheila Willis, Director of the Irish Forensic Science Laboratory, has recently been 
awarded ENFSI funding from 2010 to 2013 to look at these issues and make relevant proposals. 
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 with very different intellectual backgrounds. Several years ago Robertson and 
Vignaux published what is considered to be the best work on the subject, aimed at 
judges (Robertson & Vignaux, 1995). Aitken and Taroni (Aitken & Taroni, 2004) 
offer a more statistical form of approach. We would offer three basic principles 
for interpreting scientific evidence (Champod & Evett, 2009): 
 
1) The scientific element must be interpreted in the light of the circumstances 
of the particular case. Experts must have a certain amount of information 
about the case in question so that the results obtained and their 
interpretation can be put in context; 
2) A rational and balanced interpretation of the scientific element is only 
possible if the results are assessed in the light of both the prosecution and 
defence cases; 
3) The questions that the technical expert must answer are always concerned 
with the probabilities associated with the technical results obtained 
(having regard to the respective prosecution and defence cases) and not 
with the probabilities of the cases themselves187. 
 
The first principle means that technical experts must be informed at the right 
moment of the respective cases of the prosecution and defence. Following various 
judicial errors in Britain, the 1993 report of the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice (Roberts & Willmore, 1993) called for closer communication between 
experts and the parties. Under the second principle expert reports would present 
results that took account of all the hypotheses advanced, irrespective of which 
party had commissioned the expert. This means that experts working for the 
prosecution should still be informed of the defence case in order to secure the 
necessary balance. The same applies to experts appointed by the court or the 
defence. The third principle establishes precise terminological rules for the 
conclusions of expert reports and their presentation to the courts188.  
The recent AFSP UK and Ireland (Association of Forensic Science 
Providers, 2009) standards lay down a number of important principles on the 
drafting of expert reports and statements, including: 
– the need for an explicit evaluation of the forensic results in relation both 
to the facts alleged by the prosecution and the case submitted by the 
defence. This evaluation must be conducted on the basis of a formal and 
transparent logical framework; 
– experts' ability to present the scientific bases of their analyses; 
                                                 
187   Otherwise the technical expert would be making the mistake of “prosecutor’s fallacy” or 
“inversion fallacy” (see footnote 35) or offering evidence which included more than just an 
assessment of the scientific elements. 
188   More specific recommendations are made by Evett et al. (2000). 
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– the need for experts to document, and report, the various stages of their 
work and the reasoning behind their conclusions.  
The Barry George case highlights the benefits of such standards. Barry 
George was convicted in 2001 of the murder of the journalist Jill Dando. The 
prosecution evidence included textile fibres from the victim's raincoat which 
matched Mr George's trousers189 and a particle of firearms discharge residue 
found in the suspect's pocket nearly a year after the murder. At the first trial the 
discharge residue was described as "consistent" with the hypothesis that it came 
from the weapon used to kill Miss Dando190. The appeal followed a review by the 
Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) of the strength of the forensic 
evidence. The CCRC suggested that work undertaken by the Forensic Science 
Service (FSS) on interpretation should serve as the new means of assessing 
forensic evidence. It was this work that formed the basis of the AFSP standard 
referred to above.  
When the plausibility of the results was assessed in a balanced manner, 
taking account of the defence as well as the prosecution cases, it emerged that the 
discharge residue found in Barry George's pocket could be equally explained with 
his having fired the shot (the prosecution argument) or not having fired it (the 
defence case). In other words the recovery of the discharge residue was 
essentially neutral and did not make it possible in any way to support either of the 
arguments put forward. The evidence was not useful information for the court and 
its presentation at the first trial, with the use of the term "consistent", was likely to 
give it undue evidential value. As a result, the court of appeal eventually 
overturned the first judgment191. In preparation for the second trial, the discharge 
residue was deemed to be inadmissible evidence. Barry George was finally 
acquitted in August 2008. Had there not been a reassessment of the strength of 
this evidence, based on the principles of balance and transparency, he may still be 
in prison. 
7. Issues for discussion and conclusions 
The literature consulted has identified a number of ways of improving the 
presentation of expert opinions to the courts. Here, we will put forward some of 
those that appear to offer the most promise, whether the system is basically 
accusatorial or inquisitorial, based on the principle that the process will benefit 
from the maximum possible transparency for all those concerned. 
                                                
189   The fibre evidence was to play a relatively minor part in the case. 
190   The weapon used to fire the fatal shot was never found. 
191   R. v. Barry George, UK Court of Appeal, [2007] EWCA Crim 2722. 
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 Preparing the expert evidence  
 
• A greater defence input 
 
Throughout the period of preparation of expert evidence and as early as 
possible in the proceedings, the parties should be able to interact with the 
expert in a transparent fashion. The parties should not be authorised to be 
present when the scientific tests are being conducted, since this might 
interfere with the smooth running of the operation, but they must be 
allowed to submit working hypotheses that the expert should take into 
account. We are emphasising here the role of the defence, but naturally 
experts must also receive appropriate information from the prosecuting 
authorities192. 
 
• Court-appointed experts 
 
Many lawyers and scientists operating in accusatorial systems see the 
notion of court-appointed experts as a miracle solution. We are more 
sceptical, since experience shows that such experts generally work more 
with the criminal prosecution authorities than with the defence, and the 
latter often find it difficult to find an alternative expert of equivalent 
status. Moreover, the neutrality of court-appointed experts gives them de 
facto a privileged status in that they have the almost total confidence of 
the court. Add to this the fact that in inquisitorial-type proceedings, there 
is no "culture" of questioning the word of experts, since defence lawyers 
have the impression that this could be seen by judges as criticising their 
choice and therefore be counter-productive for the defence case. Such a 
system does not therefore contribute to a critical assessment of expert 
reports and is not sufficient, we believe, to ensure that scientific evidence 
will receive a rational appraisal193.  
 
We do, however, see advantages in employing court-appointed experts to 
assist courts to assess complex issues involving conflicting evidence 
                                                 
192   As Roberts and Willmore (1993, p. 137) state, after analysing 27 sets of forensic evidence, 
"Our research suggests that the superficially attractive objective of shielding the forensic scientist 
from information which might inappropriately influence her scientific judgment should be 
abandoned in favour of more productive efforts to improve the extent and quality of the 
information exchange between FSS scientists and instructing lawyers." 
193   The Auld report (1991) presents similar arguments against proposals to increase the number 
of court-appointed experts in the United Kingdom's accusatorial system. 
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presented by the parties. This is the compromise advocated by Patenaude 
(2003, pp. 170-171) in Canada. 
• Pre-trial conferences and joint expertise194, and multiple expert witnesses 
(hot-tubbing)195 
Joint expertise is where different experts whose conclusions are likely to 
diverge meet outside of the court to identify areas of agreement196 and then 
submit to that court only evidence that is still the subject of debate. This 
saves time by only presenting to the courts contested items of evidence, 
and also helps the defence because each expert is forced to assess the 
other's point of view197. 
Joint hearings of experts, or so-called hot-tubbing, means that all 
the experts are heard in court at the same time. Each presents his or her 
findings in turn and can then comment on what the others have said. The 
judge and the parties have an opportunity to ask questions, and the whole 
process continues informally so that points of agreement and disagreement 
can be clearly identified. 
Such approaches are attractive, but are only significant when the 
parties or the authorities have commissioned several experts, whose 
conclusions differ. This does not resolve the problem of how to assess 
expert evidence when only one expert has been called – which is often the 
case with inquisitorial proceedings – and no one challenges his or her 
conclusions.  
• Give precedence to written reports 
Since scientific evidence is often very complex, it is much easier for the 
parties to understand, even in countries using the accusatorial system, 
when it comes in written form, setting out the steps in the process and the 
findings. It may also be worth encouraging the use of visual aids such as 
photos and diagrams to back up written or oral explanations.  
                                               
194   See Part 33, Rule 33(5) of the Criminal Procedure Rules (United Kingdom), following the 
Auld report (1991). In an accusatorial system this may have the disadvantage that counsel will 
lose control over their experts. However, the Court of Appeal has recently referred to the benefits 
of this system in R. v. David Reed and Terence Reed, R. v. Neil Garmson, UK Court of Appeal, 
[2009] EWCA Crim 2698 and R. v. Weller, [2010] EWCA Crim 1085. 
195   For more on this subject see Edmond (2009).  
196   For example, they may agree on the way to explain a certain technology, a demonstration of 
certain phenomena, a glossary of key terms or a chronology of certain events (Sommer, 2009). 
197   Roberts (1994, p. 492). 
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 Finally, in the interests of transparency, experts should be asked to 
make their laboratory notes available to the court and the parties (even if 
they are not made a formal part of the case-file, as in inquisitorial 
proceedings) during the procedure and when they give evidence in 
court198. 
 
Assessing expert evidence  
 
• Standards of interpretation  
 
There should be a standard for the scientific interpretation of results to 
serve as a guide to the framing of expert reports, the terminology to be 
used and how conclusions should be expressed. It should be disseminated 
both among experts and the courts, with appropriate training. 
 
• Making lawyers more aware of the fallibility of expert evidence and the 
notion of interpretation  
 
A good understanding of scientific evidence depends less on the criteria 
that are adopted than on the willingness of courts to assess critically the 
material presented to them. Significant efforts must be made to make all 
those involved in the judicial system fully aware of the weaknesses of 
forensic reports. However well developed a technique may be, it still has 
to be applied by humans and errors are always possible. The parties must 
be aware of this and adopt a critical approach to such reports and the 
courts must also be conscious of the need to give proper weight to such 
evidence.  
                                                 
198   Still, in the interests of transparency and to facilitate assessment of experts' work, their reports 
should include the following: 
–  the expert's qualifications: training, accreditation and experience; 
– an exhaustive account of the information and documents received by the authority, or where 
appropriate by the parties; 
– a detailed description of the operations and procedures carried out; 
– the identity and qualifications of the assistants who have helped the expert to produce the 
report, and a description of their tasks; 
– any theoretical disagreements in the relevant field, and the personal position of the expert 
and the reasons for this position; 
– a discussion of the findings, in terms of alternatives put forward; 
– the expert's conclusions; 
– useful illustrations and references; 
– a statement that the expert was informed of his or her procedural obligations, such as 
professional confidentiality and the consequences of producing an inaccurate expert report. 
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But experts' work does not end with the reading of their analytical 
findings. The significance of scientific evidence in any particularly case is 
always subject to interpretation and this cannot be placed within the close 
confines of an ISO accreditation. When the evidence is taken it has be seen 
in the general context of the case and there has to be close communication 
between the expert and the court to ensure that the former provides the 
latter with useful information and that the latter does not form an 
exaggerated opinion of the expert's conclusions.  
This has to be seen in relation to court-appointed experts. It is not 
sufficient for the court to rely on the confidence it has in its expert. Nor do 
joint expert reports and joint hearings of experts offer any solution to this 
problem.  
Supra-national approaches  
• A scientific evidence assessment committee  
One possibility might be to establish a European body on the lines of the 
British Forensic Science Advisory Council199 and Forensic Science 
Regulator200 to act as the main adviser to political and judicial authorities 
on the reliability of the scientific techniques that are used. This is the 
position adopted by Alldridge (1992b) following his analysis of DNA 
evidence. In line with technological developments, certain forms of 
scientific evidence come to be seen by those involved in the judicial field 
as almost infallible. The more a particular form of scientific evidence is 
deemed, of itself, to be critical, the more necessary it becomes to subject it 
to the rigorous assessment of an independent body. 
Such a body would not have binding powers, but could nevertheless issue 
recommendations to domestic courts that would assist judges when they 
had to rule on the admissibility of a new forensic technique or the 
reliability of a new form of evidence, or when it seemed appropriate to 
abandon a form of evidence that had become obsolete. Such a procedure 
would take time, which would be quite welcome to certain figures who 
consider that the judicial system should keep its distance from "cutting 
edge scientific discoveries"201. As Patenaude pointed out (2003, p. 180), 
                                               
199   This body was set up in 1993 on the recommendation of the Runciman report (1993), which 
followed a number of judicial errors in Great Britain. 
200   http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/police/forensic-science-regulator/ 
201   Alldridge (1999).  
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 the idea is not a new one. It was indeed included in the statutes of the 
International Academy of Criminalistics, founded in 1929. 
 
• An international panel of experts 
 
As we have seen, the number of experts that the courts can call on is often 
limited. The result is that in any particular geographical area it may be 
difficult to find an expert who specialises in the field in question and 
therefore impossible to find an expert for the defence, or simply a private 
scientific consultant, in the same field and with the same level of 
experience202. It would undoubtedly improve the situation if domestic 
courts could call on the services of other European experts203. The aim 
would be to establish a European register of experts with its own 
machinery for registering individuals and recognising laboratories, to 
ensure that there was a sufficient number of experts available in the 
increasingly varied fields of forensic science.  
 
• Code of Ethics204 
 
A European ethical code for all forensic experts would have particular 
symbolic significance. It might require those concerned: 
– to perform their duties in a neutral and impartial fashion, on 
behalf of the court rather than either of the parties; 
– to take account of all relevant information in carrying out their 
work; 
– to describe clearly the facts and observations on which their 
opinion was based and report any gaps in the initial data that 
made it impossible to reach any definitive conclusions; 
– to refuse to reply to questions that fell outside their sphere of 
responsibility, or which only the court was competent to answer; 
– to advise the court immediately of any change of opinion on the 
substance of their conclusions, after reporting to or being heard 
by the court; 
                                                 
202   This issue was raised in the Eggertsdottir v. Iceland judgment. The applicants had questioned 
the independence of the experts commissioned by the Icelandic government, which had responded 
that inevitably, given the size of the country, the medical experts representing both sides would 
work in the same hospital.  
203   In 2000, Jakobs and Spangers noted that securing experts for the defence was a problem in the 
majority of European systems and called for a European list of experts . 
204   See Meintjes–van Der Walt (2003, p. 99). 
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– to provide the court, on request, with their personal notes and 
any other documentation relevant to the case.  
Saks (1989) provided an overview of ethics codes that existed at the end 
of the 1980s. The need for such a code of ethics was also one of the specific 
recommendations of the National Research Council (2009) report. The ENFSI 
also has a code of conduct205 that includes some of the aforementioned elements. 
It simply needs to be made more generally applicable. 
The increasingly significant advances in the field of scientific evidence are 
posing fresh challenges to domestic legal systems because of the additional 
problems they raise in terms of equality of arms, and more specifically the ability 
of the defence to call on the services of forensic experts of the same standard as 
those available to the criminal prosecution authorities. 
We believe that this calls for a thorough review of the law on how 
scientific evidence should be presented and evaluated by the courts. Given the 
speed with which forensic techniques are evolving and the day-to-day constraints 
on the activities of the courts – lack of time, material resources and personnel and 
the range of cases they have to deal with – it is unreasonable to expect judges, 
prosecutors and counsel to reach a conclusion on issues that are still sometimes 
the subject of debate in the scientific community itself. We are conscious of 
strong pressure to adopt criteria similar to the Daubert standard to determine 
whether scientific evidence is admissible206. We have reservations about such an 
approach. The guidelines laid down in the Daubert decision have some merit but 
they place a considerable burden on judges who completely lack the technical 
knowledge to apply them properly. We believe that some of the avenues 
previously explored offer more effective ways of dealing with the challenges of 
forensic science for the criminal justice system. 
One final lesson is provided by the early use of DNA in the courts. If 
DNA analysis is now considered to be a highly safe forensic technique, this is 
because in the 1990s the courts, and in particular defence lawyers, put great 
pressure on forensic experts and the prosecution authorities who employed them. 
Much effort went into improving their practices and demonstrating that it was a 
reliable technique before this form of evidence was deemed admissible. Yet in 
many other areas, forensic experts have failed to address their own shortcomings 
and the courts should no longer accept evidence whose reliability has not been 
established. The criminal justice system is forensic science's one and only client 
and it must therefore insist on a product that fully matches its needs207.  
                                                
205   http://www.enfsi.eu/page.php?uid=43 
206   This is particularly the case with the Law Commission (2009). 
207   As Faigman (1999, p. 82) puts it: "The law is a consumer that receives only as good as it 
demands." See also (Thompson, 1997; DeCoux, 2007, p. 135). 
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